Theoretical analysis of price transmission: a case of joint production by Antonova, Maria
 The Institute for Agricultural Economics 
of the Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 
 
 
Theoretical analysis of price transmission: 
A case of joint production 
 
Dissertation 
submitted for the Doctoral Degree 
awarded by the Faculty of Agricultural and Nutritional Sciences 
of the 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel 
 
Submitted by 
M.Sc. Maria Antonova 
From Russian Federation, Kazan 
 
Kiel, 2013 
Dean:     Prof. Dr Karin Schwarz 
1. Examiner   Prof. Dr Jens-Peter Loy 
2. Examiner   Prof. Dr. Thomas Glauben 
Day of Oral Examination:   11.07.2013 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gedruckt mit Genehmigung der Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Jesus looked at them and said, “All things are possible with God” (Matthew 19:26). My 
dissertation is one more example in my life confirming this Bible verse.  
 
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude for the continuous support, insight and patience of 
my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Jens-Peter Loy. I am so thankful for his trust, scholarly input and 
valuable guidance throughout my research. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Thomas Glauben for 
his valuable comments.  
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Dr h.c. mult. Ulrich Koester, whose unsurpassed 
knowledge, good advice, support, friendship and continuous encouragement helped me to 
overcome many difficulties. I am so much happy that I have a chance to personally communicate 
with him, because he is one of the best examples of a true scientist for me.  
 
This work would not have been possible without the kind help of Dr. Zhanna Kapsalyamova, 
whose lessons on economic modelling enriched my knowledge and contributed to the modelling 
basis of my dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Carsten Steinhagen, Thomas Mithbauer, Dr. 
Friedrich Hedtrich, Dr. Aidan Islyami, Prof. Dr. Vasyl Golosnoi, Dr. Artem Korzhenevych and 
Prof. Dr. Elena Berdisheva for their technical support and valuable comments on the early 
versions of my dissertation. I am thankful to Swetlana Petri, Janine Empen, Fabian Schaper, Dr. 
Meike Wocken, Dr. Angela Hoffmann, Dr. Yonca Limon, Heike Senkler and other dear friends 
and colleagues for a nice company and interesting discussions on agricultural economics. I 
would like to express my special gratitude to the Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel for 
financially supporting my doctoral studies. I am also very grateful to the secretary of our 
department, Kirsten Kriegel, for her unconditional help that arose throughout my work.  
 
I am very much grateful to my dearest family and especially to my parents, Irina and Petr, for 
their immense love and encouragement during my doctoral studies. I am especially thankful to 
my mother who has greatly encouraged me to pursue, continue and finish my doctoral work, 
giving me support, advice and love. I would also like to thank my youngest brother Mikhail for 
his love and help in typing and composing several appendixes in this work.  
 
I would like to extend my special gratitude to my friends from the Church in Hamburg, Stuttgart 
and Berlin. 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
Summary (Zusammenfassung)  vi 
List of figures viii 
List of tables ix 
List of appendixes xi 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1 
 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
 
 
8 
 2.1. Definition of price transmission 
2.2. Theoretical research on price transmission 
2.2.1.   Factors determining farm-retail price transmission 
2.2.2. Imperfect market structure as a determinant of price transmission 
2.2.3. Price transmission in different production conditions 
8 
13 
14 
19 
21 
 
Chapter 3. General structure of the equilibrium displacement model (EDM) by the 
example of McCorristons’ et al. (2001) study 
 
 
 
24 
 3.1. Market structure, input factors and an output commodity 24 
            3.2. Specification of the processing technology and the output supply function 30 
 3.3. Market forms and firms behaviour 31 
 3.4. Solution techniques 33 
 3.5. Price transmission elasticity 35 
 3.6. Numerical application of model results and a sensitivity analysis 43 
 
Chapter 4. The price transmission of joint products 
 
 
56 
   4.1. Theoretical framework of the model “Price transmission of joint products” 56 
   4.2. The price transmission elasticity of a joint product and its main determinants 60 
v 
 
 4.3. Interpretation of results and sensitivity analysis 65 
 4.3.1. The price transmission of a single vs. jointly-produced output 66 
 4.3.2. Price transmission for a single vs. aggregated joint outputs 69 
 4.3.3. Determinants of the price transmission elasticity of a jointly-produced good 70 
 a. Sensitivity with respect to the market organisation parameters 70 
 1.a. Market power 71 
 2.a. Elasticity of supply of material input 76 
 3.a. Elasticities of demand of joint products 82 
 b. Sensitivity with respect to the production technology 87 
 1.b. Parameters describing inputs combination 88 
 2.b. Parameters representing the throughput separation 92 
 3.b. Returns to scale parameter 95 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
 
102 
References 107 
Appendixes 115 
Curriculum Vitae 134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Um die Preisbeziehungen entlang der Wertschöpfungskette bei Lebensmitteln zu bewerten, ist es 
notwendig, die Prozesse der Preisbildung theoretisch zu erklären. Es gibt einige theoretische 
Modelle, die aber allesamt Monoproduktansätze sind, eine Modellierung der 
Preiszusammenhänge für den Multiproduktfall fehlt bislang. Die vorliegende Dissertation 
möchte hierzu einen Beitrag leisten. 
Ein erstes Modell in diesem Bereich stammt von Gardner (1975), der die Methode der 
Gleichgewichtsverschiebung verwendet. Die Methode der Gleichgewichtsverschiebung wurde 
Mitte des letzten Jahrhunderts entwickelt und findet noch heute im Bereich der theoretischen 
Marktmodellierung Anwendung. McCorriston et. al. (2001) verwenden diesen Ansatz, um den 
Einfluss von Marktmacht und Skalenerträgen auf die Höhe der Preistransmissionselastizität zu 
bestimmen. Sie können zeigen, dass die Preistransmission bei vollkommenem Wettbewerb 
stärker ist als bei nicht vollkommenem Wettbewerb. Die Preistransmission ist zudem bei 
Industrien mit steigenden Skalenerträgen höher als bei Industrien mit konstanten Skalenerträgen. 
Die Sensibilitätsanalyse im Rahmen verschiedener Szenarien zeigt, dass die Wirkungen der 
Skalenerträge die der Marktmacht verstärken oder reduzieren können. Sowohl Gardner als auch 
McCorriston et. al. (2001) haben sich bei ihren Untersuchungen auf einen einzelnen Output 
beschränkt. Im landwirtschaftlichen Bereich gibt es viele Beispiele für Multiinputs und 
Multioutputs bei der Verarbeitung, z.B. die Verarbeitung von Milch zu Butter und 
Magermilchpulver. 
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird deshalb die Preistransmission aufbauend auf dem Modell von 
McCorriston et. al. (2001) für einen Multioutput und Multiinputfall modelliert. Als Beispiel dient 
die Milchverarbeitung, die einerseits Koppelprodukte wie Butter und Milchpulver oder Käse und 
Molke produziert, wobei beide Gruppen selbst also Käse und Butter Substitute darstellen. Die 
Ergebnisse verdeutlichen die Rolle der Verbundproduktion für die Preistransmission. So ist die 
Preistransmission bei vollkommenem Wettbewerb nicht mehr gleich dem Anteil des 
landwirtschaftlichen Inputs wie im Modell von McCorriston et. al. (1989). Bei perfektem 
Wettbewerb sowie konstanten Skalenerträgen hängt die Transmission des Preises verbundener 
Endprodukte von dem Anteil des landwirtschaftlichen Inputs und von der Elastizität der 
Nachfrage der gemeinsam produzierten Güter sowie von dem Anteil der verbunden produzierten 
Produkte am Brutto-Endprodukt ab. Die Preisänderung eines Inputs wird in Abhängigkeit von 
den Preiselastizitäten der Nachfrage unterschiedlich auf die Preise der im Verbund produzierten 
Endprodukte übertragen.  
 
vii 
 
Summary 
 
In order to improve the market-based relationships between the stakeholders of the food chain 
and to increase transparency along the chain it is necessary not only to detect the incomplete 
price relationship, but also to identify the causes of its malfunctioning. A number of studies 
investigate the mechanism of price transmission in order to theoretically identify the causes of 
incomplete price transmission. This dissertation intends to enlarge the theory on this issue. 
Following Gardner (1975), such studies traditionally use the equilibrium displacement 
methodology for this purpose. Since the middle of the last century, the equilibrium displacement 
methodology has been developed to incorporate new features, thus, contributing to the new 
results and discoveries in price transmission theory. For example, McCorriston et al. (2001) 
study the impact of market power and returns to scale on price transmission elasticity. By 
assigning certain values to the model parameters they prove that price transmission under perfect 
competition is higher than under imperfect competition, and that price transmission in the 
industry with increasing returns to scale, is higher than in the industry, with constant returns to 
scale. The sensitivity analysis within different scenarios shows that the role of returns to scale 
may either reinforce or offset the impact of market power. Gardner and McCorriston et al., 
however, focus on a single output product, whereas agricultural inputs often serve as ingredients 
for multiple outputs. Multiple outputs are generated spontaneously from a single production 
process so that the increase in production of one good cannot take place without a simultaneous 
increase in production of the other good. Therefore this work extends the model of McCorriston 
et. al. (2001) for price transmission in the case of multi-inputs-multi-outputs. Dairy industry is 
chosen as an example for this model, which produces goods-complements in production such as 
butter and skim milk powder or cheese and whey, however, both groups present the example of 
goods-substitutes in production, such as cheese and butter. Model results show that it is 
necessary to consider the properties of joint production when estimating the price transmission of 
jointly-produced goods because the price transmission of a jointly-produced output is different 
from that of a single output. The price transmission of a joint output is not equal to the share of 
agricultural input, as it is in the case of a single output (McCorriston et al., 1989). In the case of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the price transmission of a joint output depends 
not only on the share of the agricultural input, as in the case of a single output, but additionally 
on the elasticities of demand of the jointly-produced goods and on the share of the joint output in 
a gross output. The price of an input is differently transmitted to two jointly-produced goods 
depending on two independent retail demand elasticities of those goods.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Background of the topic 
 
Agricultural prices have displayed extreme fluctuations over the last two years, reaching 
exceptional levels in the second half of 2007 and the first months of 2008 before falling sharply 
in the wake of the economic crisis (European Commission, 2009a). Since then, the prices of 
many commodities have come down to levels comparable to or even lower than those reached 
before the start of the price surge. However, consumer food prices continued to increase, and 
only started declining in May 2009, raising concerns about the functioning of the food supply 
chain. These changes have caused considerable hardship for agricultural producers while 
currently implying that consumers are not getting a fair deal (European Commission, 2009b). 
The magnitude, delay and asymmetry in the adjustment of food prices have raised serious 
concerns about the functioning of the EU food supply chain and the distribution of value-added 
between primary producers, processors, wholesalers and retailers. The effective distribution of 
benefits among the food supply chain is crucial to remain competitive (regarding consumers 
wanting lower prices and agricultural producers higher prices). This is important, first, for the 
efficient welfare distribution in the society, and second, to ensure that various economic actors 
fully benefit from agricultural policy reforms toward greater market orientation. 
 
There are a number of studies estimating incomplete price transmission on various agricultural 
markets (e.g. Houck, 1977; Kinnukan & Forker, 1987; Griffith & Piggott, 1994; Zhang et al., 
1995; Punyawadee et al., 1991; Traill & Henson, 1994; Worth, 2000; Parrot et al., 2001; Sanjuan 
& Gil, 2001; Ben-Kaabia & Gil, 2007; etc.). However, in order to improve the market-based 
relationships between the stakeholders of the food chain and to increase transparency along the 
chain it is necessary not only to detect the incomplete price relationship, but also to identify the 
causes of its malfunctioning. There are a number of studies investigating the mechanism of price 
transmission in order to theoretically identify the causes of incomplete price transmission. 
 
Theory and methodology 
 
Studies investigating the theoretical underpinnings of price transmission tend to describe the 
adoption process of a price variable in response to deviations from a given target level. 
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Following Gardner (1975) such studies traditionally use the equilibrium displacement 
methodology for this purpose. Since the middle of the last century the equilibrium displacement 
methodology has been developed to incorporate new features, thus, contributing to the new 
results and discoveries in price transmission theory (e.g., Gardner, 1975; Heien, 1980; 
Wohlgenant, 1989; Schroeter & Azzam, 1990; Holloway, 1991, McCorriston et al., 1985, etc.). 
McCorriston et al. (2001) study the impact of market power and returns to scale on price 
transmission elasticity. By assigning certain values to the model parameters they prove that price 
transmission under perfect competition is higher than under imperfect competition, and that price 
transmission in the industry with increasing returns to scale, is higher than in the industry, with 
constant returns to scale. The sensitivity analysis within different scenarios shows that the role of 
returns to scale may either reinforce or offset the impact of market power. 
 
Development of the theory and methodology 
 
Major studies on the theoretical aspects of price transmission typically focus on a single output 
product. For instance, Gardner (1975), Heien (1980), Wohlgenant (1989), Holloway (1991) and 
McCorriston et al. (1998; 2001) use two inputs and one output framework, and only Schroeter 
and Azzam (1990) note that a “single” output could potentially represent a set of multiple 
outputs produced in fixed proportions. Agricultural inputs often serve as ingredients for multiple 
outputs. In dairy industry multiple outputs include goods-complements in production (butter and 
skim milk powder or cheese and whey) and substitutes in production (butter and cheese). In 
order to detect the impact of price transmission on production decisions of dairy processors price 
transmission of multiple outputs should be estimated.  In order to estimate price transmission for 
multiple outputs we first have to incorporate the impact of goods-compliments in production into 
the system. Our results show that the aggregated price transmission of goods-complements in 
production is not equal to price transmission of a single output, which means that the effect of 
goods-complements in production must be considered when estimating price transmission for 
goods-substitutes in production. This study thoroughly investigates the impact of goods-
complements in production, which are also called jointly-produced goods.  
 
Jointly-produced goods are generated spontaneously from a single production process so that the 
increase in production of one good cannot take place without a simultaneous increase in 
production of the other good (Fanno, 1974). Price of one jointly-produced good is only one part 
of the global cost, being directly dependent on the price of another joint good. Hence, one risks 
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losing information when estimating the price transmission elasticity for a jointly-produced good 
if the impact of another jointly-produced good is ignored.  
 
Empirical studies on the dairy market (Kinnukan & Forker, 1987; Serra & Goodwin, 2003; 
Chavas & Kim, 2005) lack the theoretical background on price transmission for jointly-produced 
products. Mostly, they use Gardner‟s framework as the one relevant to their study and assume 
unique retail demand elasticity while estimating the price transmissions for various dairy 
products, despite the fact that there is no prove that the price transmission elasticity of a single 
product is identical to that of a jointly-produced product.  
 
To fill the gap in the theory of price transmission, we extend the study of McCorriston et al. 
(2001) to the case of two jointly-produced goods by constructing a cohesive conceptual 
framework to investigate the theoretical properties of the price transmission from input to two 
jointly-produced outputs. We are primarily interested in whether the price transmission elasticity 
of a single output is the same as or different from that of a jointly-produced output. Second, we 
compare the price transmission elasticities of jointly-produced goods. We verify whether they 
are identical or different, and determine the cases when they are identical or different. Third, we 
identify whether the market power and returns to scale parameters equally affect the transmission 
elasticities of jointly-produced goods. Fourth, we determine whether the impact of other 
parameters on the price transmission elasticities of jointly-produced goods is different from the 
impact on the price transmission of a single good. Finally, we verify whether markets have a 
cross-impact on the price transmission elasticities of jointly-produced goods. 
 
Research aims 
 
The study attempts to address the following two questions: 
 
(1) Theory and methodology: What is price transmission and what type of methodology 
might be used to investigate theoretical properties of price transmission? 
(2) Development of the theory and methodology: Is the price transmission of a jointly- 
produced good, or an aggregated price transmission of a set of jointly-produced goods 
identical to that of a single output? Specifically, the question identifies whether the 
results by McCorriston et al. (2001) are valid for the case of jointly-produced good. 
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These questions contribute to the description of the base knowledge of the theory on price 
transmission.  
 
Value of this research 
 
This is one of the first studies that attempts to review research on theoretical aspects of price 
transmission and investigates the theoretical aspects of price transmission for jointly-produced 
outputs.  
 
Frames of the research 
 
Market structure constraints 
 
A number of research studies have extended Gardner‟s (1975) equilibrium displacement model - 
to include various assumptions of market structure. Holloway (1991) extends Gardner‟s 
framework of perfect competition in the marketing sector to a conjectural-variations oligopoly 
model. Schroeter and Azzam (1990) decompose a marketing margin into components reflecting 
the marginal cost of processing industry, oligopoly and oligopsony price distortions and an 
output price risk component. McCorriston et al. (2001) assume production, processing and 
retailing levels with processor, applying oligopoly power against retailers. In the model “Price 
transmission in joint production” we do not extend market structure for the oligopsony case: 
instead, we leave the market structure as in McCorriston et al. (2001) for the sake of comparison 
between the price transmissions of single vs. jointly-produced goods.  
 
The nature of production  
 
McCorriston et al. (2001) study the impact of processing the agricultural input on the 
transmission of prices for a single output. Agricultural inputs often serve as ingredients for 
multiple outputs. Multiple outputs can be either substitutes, such as butter and cheese, or 
complements, such as butter and skim milk powder. For the latter case of joint products we 
extend the model by McCorriston et al. (2001). Further research would be to extend the model of 
goods-complements in production to the case of goods-substitutes in production.  
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Outline  
 
The research questions indicated above reflect the outline of the study. In the second chapter 
“Literature review” the definition of price transmission is composed and the major studies, 
investigating theoretical aspects of price transmissions, are reviewed and structured. In the third 
chapter we give a detailed overview of an equilibrium displacement model by McCorriston et al. 
(2001). The overview contains description of the market structure, input factors and an output 
commodity, specification of the processing technology, market forms and firm‟s behaviour, 
solution techniques, resulting equation of price transmission elasticity, numerical application of 
model results and a sensitivity analysis. This chapter also provides additional explanations for 
McCorriston et al. (2001) results.   
 
The fourth chapter first presents the theoretical framework of the model “Price transmission for 
joint products”. Second, it discusses the price transmission elasticity of a joint product and its 
main determinants. Third, it provides a sensitivity analysis and key results that are achieved in 
the model “Price transmission for joint products”. The subsection price transmission for a single 
vs. jointly-produced output discusses whether it is plausible to apply the results achieved for the 
price transmission of a single output to a case of a joint output. The subsection price transmission 
for a single vs. aggregated joint outputs clarifies whether it is essential to detect the impact of 
goods-complements in production when estimating price transmission for goods-substitutes in 
production. Then the determinants of the price transmission elasticity of a jointly-produced good 
are discussed in great detail through the case studies. The chapter ends with a sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the market power parameter, elasticity of supply of materials input, elasticities of 
demand of joint products, parameters describing inputs combination, parameters describing 
throughput separation and returns to scale parameter.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature review 
 
This chapter draws attention to the problem of incomplete price transmission, defines it and 
discusses the reasons for estimating price transmission. Reviewing the literature sources we 
focus on the factors impacting price transmission and discuss research methodology which 
allows investigating theoretical aspects of price transmission.  
 
2.1. Definition of price transmission 
An efficient marketing system is essential to keep the pace of economic growth. In an efficient 
marketing system, producers are able to get remunerative prices to their products and consumers 
to get the product at affordable prices (Kanakaraj, 2010). An efficient marketing system in 
agriculture is the pre-condition to achieve food security. An uninterrupted, qualitative food 
supply ensures healthy people and hence, a healthy society.   
 
The extent of marketing efficiency depends on the nature of market structure, market conduct 
and market performance. Seller and buyer concentration, the firms size and entry conditions are 
the main elements of market structure, impacting the nature of competition and pricing within 
the market. Market conduct indicates the behavior of market agents with regard to price 
determination, sales promotion tactics and the regulatory activities of government. Price 
formation has a direct link with these actions. If market agents determine prices on the basis of 
some collusive tactics, it will lead to an imperfect price transmission within the given market or 
in-between the markets, and therefore to the inefficient marketing system as a whole. On the 
other hand, if price is determined in the way of a perfectly competitive market, it resembles an 
effective marketing system.  
 
The economic result of market structure and of market conduct represents market performance 
(Kanakaraj, 2010 p. 53). Market performance resembles price level, profit margin, level of 
investment, reinvestment of profit etc. In an economy, if the price fixed by the firm is just equal 
to average cost (the condition in perfect competition), the market is said to be performing well or 
efficient. In other words, through the level of prices and the level of profit margin, one can 
determine the degree of market efficiency. 
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There are two criteria to measure marketing efficiency. One is market integration and the other is 
price spread. For examining the efficiency of a marketing system, one must inevitably look at the 
degree to which village primary, secondary and terminal markets are related to each other (Lele, 
1971), which requires to address the concept of integrated markets. Whenever the actions of 
agents of one market affect the actions of agents of other markets, it is said to be a situation of 
integrated market (Kanakaraj, 2010, p. 3). Markets are known to be interlinked when transaction 
in one influences the terms of exchange in other markets. Petzel and Monke (1979-80) defined 
integrated markets as markets in which prices of differentiated products do not behave 
independently. Ravallion (1986) observes that equilibrium will have the property that, if trade 
takes place at all between any two regions, then price in the importing region equals price in the 
exporting region plus the unit transport cost incurred by moving between the two. Goodwin and 
Schroeder (1991) caution that markets that are not integrated may convey inaccurate price 
information that might distort producer's marketing decision and contribute to inefficient product 
movements. Thus, the degree of market integration determines the efficiency of a certain market. 
 
Another criteria to measure market efficiency is considered to be a price spread. Price spread is 
denoted as the difference between the price received by the producer and the price paid by the 
consumers for a commodity at a point of time (Kanakaraj, 2010, p. 59). Price spread might be 
similarly defined as the difference between the retail price of product and its value in production. 
This difference includes charges for assembling, processing, storing, transporting, wholesaling 
and retailing. Lesser the difference more efficient is the market system. Lower price spread 
allows producers and consumers to gain from affordable price and reasonable profit, thus 
contributing to higher market efficiency. Economic literature (Gardner, 1975; Schroeter and 
Azzam, 1991; etc.) sometimes operate with the term marketing margin, which in principal 
reflects the similar subject as the price spread. The “marketing margin” as computed by USDA is 
equal to the difference between the average price paid by consumers for a finished product with 
an agricultural raw material base and payment received by farmers for equivalent quantities of 
the raw material product (Beckman and Buzzell, 1995).   
 
Farm-retail price spread and marketing margin are static measures of relationship between 
prices, while price transmission concept offers to measure comparative static or dynamic price 
relationships. Price transmission is a statistical relationship between prices, which might be 
either horizontal (special) between certain markets or regions, or vertical, such as from farm to 
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retail level. Literature analyzing horizontal price linkages, however, precedes the literature 
analyzing vertical price linkages. The first dates back more than one-hundred years and was 
typically concerned with spatial price relationships, i.e., links between prices at different 
locations (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). Concepts pertaining to the spatial transmission of price 
shocks play, for example, a very important role in theories associated with market integration 
(Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 1991; Gardner and Brooks, 1994; Blauch, 1997; Baffes and Ajwad, 2001; 
Petzel and Monke, 1980; etc.). Petzel and Monke (1980), for example, investigate price linkages 
among the countries and examine the structure of price interactions. They state that prices for 
different locations cannot move independently in an integrated market system, i.e., in an 
integrated market system price in the country-buyer should be equal to the price in the country-
seller plus transportation and transaction costs (the law of one price). In markets which are not 
integrated by the price mechanism, price movements across countries and qualities would be 
essentially independent.  
 
In agricultural economics literature the vertical price transmission is defined as a statistical 
relationship between farm and retail prices. Caps and Sharewell (2005) estimate vertical price 
transmission as the percentage change in retail price of a product due to a one percent change in 
the corresponding farm price. McCorriston et al. (2001) achieves vertical price transmission as 
the ratio between price change occurring at the farm gate and the commensurate change in price 
at the retail level. The price change at the farm-gate occurs due to the exogenous shift factor, 
which represents the source of the supply shock affecting agricultural sector. Such changes in 
prices might be transmitted along the marketing chain both downstream from farm to retail and 
upstream from retail to farm (Schnepf, 2009).  
 
Vavra and Goodwin (2005) divide the vertical price transmission into the magnitude, speed and 
direction of change that are generated at different levels of the marketing process. For example, 
if a shock in the primary commodity market at the farm level induces an upward shock to the 
retail price, then what is the size and timing of any impacts on retail prices? Alternatively, one 
can evaluate the impacts on farm level prices following a shock whose first incidence is on retail 
prices. Schnepf (2009) characterizes vertical price transmission by magnitude, speed of 
adjustment and asymmetry. His reason for estimating the magnitude of price transmission is to 
answer the question: how big is the response at each level to a shock of a given size at another 
level? As already mentioned, this process is known as the degree (magnitude) of vertical price 
transmission. 
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Farm-retail price spread and price transmission concepts are traditionally used in literature on 
agricultural economics whereas conventional economics literature speaks about the cost pass-
through (Ravn et al., 2007; Nakamura, 2006; Goldberg, 1995; etc.). The cost pass-through 
represents the similar conception to the price transmission, however, from the point of view of a 
single firm, when transmission of firm costs to the firm prices is examined. While price 
transmission represents relationship between consumer and producer prices, the cost pass-
through represents relationship between product‟s costs and its output price. Ravn et. al (2007) 
defines the cost pass-through as the pass-through of changes in marginal costs to retail and 
wholesale levels, and considers it to be incomplete if a 1 percent increase in marginal cost leads 
to a less than 1 percent increase in prices. Following the number of empirical studies, which 
document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at the firm level and 
that prices are substantially less volatile than costs, Ravn et al. (2007) developed a model, which 
shows that firm-specific marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to product prices. 
That is, in response to a firm-specific increase in marginal costs, prices rise, but by less than 
marginal costs, leading to a decline in the firm-specific mark-up of prices over marginal costs. 
This is strategic behavior of the firms willing to keep their customers by reducing the 
fluctuations of prices for their products. Firms find it optimal to narrow profit margins in the 
current period to limit the decline in future habitual demand triggered by the price increase. 
 
The interest to price transmission has gained remarkable attention in the current political and 
scientific society. There are plenty of questions about this issue raised by the policy circles and 
business societies, which scientific studies attempt to answer. Do price shocks completely 
transmit from production to the retail level? What is the incidence of marketing costs on retail 
prices and farm prices? Does market power affect the transmission of price shocks from farm to 
retail levels? Who benefits under the condition of incomplete transmission of prices? Trade 
liberalisation likely over-estimates the benefits to consumers in countries that have gone through 
policy reform, because the reduction in farm prices might not be immediately or fully transmitted 
to final consumers (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). As a result, there would be smaller positive 
effects on consumer welfare and a possible increase in rents for the firms in the downstream 
sector. Thus, it is important to understand the processes related to transmission of price changes 
as price transmission assumptions along the supply chain play an important role in determining 
the size and distribution of welfare effects of trade policy reform (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). 
 
 
 
10 
 
2.2. Theoretical research on price transmission 
Although the methods of testing for empirical evidence may have indirect relevance to the 
objectives of the present study, this body of research is not directly applicable. The degree 
(magnitude) of vertical price transmission is the focus of this study, and the literature review 
below summarizes briefly work in this field.  
 
A huge bank of research exists on the topic of price transmission, which includes outstanding 
empirical and theoretical papers. However, the existing literature is far from being unified or 
conclusive, with little focus on the theoretical underpinnings (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004). In this section we highlight the theoretical research on price transmission investigation 
and deeply explore the causes of vertical price transmission. A number of studies have estimated 
the degree of price transmission between price changes occurring at the farm gate and the 
appropriate change in price at the retail level, searching for the theoretical determinants of price 
transmission. Studies discussed in this chapter estimate the impact of different kinds of 
elasticities impacting price transmission.  
2.2.1. Factors determining farm-retail price transmission 
The focus on measuring the degree of price transmission is based on the concern that there are 
some characteristics of the food market, which lead to the less-than-full pass-through of prices. 
For example, McCorriston et al. (1989; 2001) estimate the impact of different types of the 
elasticities on the relationship between farm and retail prices. These investigations report that if 
the share of an agricultural input increases, price transmission increases; if the elasticity of 
demand for an output increases, price transmission decreases (in a case of perfect competition); 
if the elasticity of substitution between inputs increases, price transmission increases; the impact 
of the elasticity of supply for marketing inputs on price transmission is ambiguous depending on 
the degree of market power (McCorriston et al., 1989). In McCorriston et al. (2001) such 
parameters as the share of agriculture, the elasticity of output demand, the elasticity of 
substitution between inputs and input supply elasticity were investigated for their impact on price 
transmission elasticity. According to the study results, if the share of agricultural input increases, 
price transmission increases; if the elasticity of demand for output increases, price transmission 
decreases (in a case of perfect competition); if the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
increases, price transmission increases; the impact of the elasticity of supply for marketing inputs 
on price transmission is ambiguous.  
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Research about the impact of different elasticities on price transmission is initially developed by 
Gardner (1975). With the help of the equilibrium displacement approach (EDM), Gardner 
investigates the relationship between farm and retail prices. The partial equilibrium framework 
of the EDM involves a linear approximation of changes in prices and quantities of inputs and 
outputs arising from new technology or weather conditions. The assumed industries represent a 
system of demand-and-supply relationships with base prices and quantities used to define an 
initial equilibrium. The impact of any exogenous change in the system, such as a new technology 
or a climate shock, is modeled as a shift in demand or supply from that initial equilibrium.  
The EDM in agricultural economics traditionally represents one output market for a food product 
and two input markets, one of which is directly affected by the external shock. A common way 
to describe these three markets in the tradition of Brandow (1962), Gardner (1975), Heien 
(1980), Wohlgenant (1989), Schroeter and Azzam (1991), Holloway (1991) and McCorriston et 
al. (1989; 2001) is by the following system of six conditions : 
1. Supply of an output, 
2. Demand for an output, 
3. Supply of a first input, 
4. Demand for a first input, 
5. Supply of a second input, 
6. Demand for a second input. 
However, the way of writing these conditions in mathematic form varies from study to study. It 
depends directly on the tasks and goals the authors pursue in their works. Although the main 
elements of this approach had already been used by Brandow (1962), Gardner (1975) is the first 
who generalized the system and gave an exhaustive analysis of all possible findings and effects 
of the EDM. Brandow‟s (1962) study is an early example of equilibrium models used in 
agricultural economics, which was no doubt a notable example for Gardner‟s (1975) 
investigation. In Gardner‟s (1975) study, a static equilibrium is “displaced”, being affected by a 
certain economic shock. Thus, the term Equilibrium “Displacement” Model (EDM) has been 
attached to a system of six equations. In this system Gardner (1975) offers a general functional 
form, which is not restricted to a particular case as it was in Brandow‟s (1962) study. Brandow‟s 
(1962) equilibrium model in its task has to determine the interrelation of the elasticities of 
demand for inputs and one output, and the interrelation of the elasticities of supply for inputs and 
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one output. Brandow (1962) proved that demand for one input, quantities of other inputs held 
constant, is elastic, unit elastic or inelastic accordingly, as a demand for output is elastic, unit 
elastic or inelastic. If both inputs have the same supply elasticity, e.g., k, then the supply 
elasticity of output is also k. If supplies of inputs are perfectly elastic, so is the supply of an 
output. If the quantities of inputs are fixed, so is the quantity of an output.  
Gardner (1975) approaches EDM differently, than Brandow (1962) does. His main interest is the 
farm-retail price spread. According to Gardner (p. 400) price spread might be measured by the 
difference between the retail and farm price, by the ratio of the prices, by the farmer‟s share of 
the food dollar, or by the percentage marketing margin. Garder (1975) thoroughly investigates 
the change in the farm-retail price ratio due to the shocks displacing the equilibrium situation. 
For that he introduces the food demand shift, farm product supply shift and marketing input 
supply shift in the six-condition system. Gardner (1975) not only finds the impact of these 
shifters on the retail-farm price ratio, but also examines this impact in different economic 
scenarios. For example, the impact of the food demand shift on the retail-farm price ratio is 
found under the different supply elasticities of agricultural and material inputs and different 
elasticities of substitution between inputs. The impact of a farm supply shift on the retail-farm 
price ratio is found under the different elasticities of substitution between inputs and different 
supply elasticities of marketing input. The impact of a marketing input supply shift on the retail-
farm price ratio is estimated under the marketing input price change, different elasticities of 
substitution between inputs and different supply elasticities of agricultural input.  
As a result, Gardner concludes (1975, p. 406) that no simple mark-up pricing rule - a fixed 
percentage margin, a fixed absolute margin or a combination of the two – can in general 
accurately depict the relationship between the farm and retail price. This is so because these 
prices move together in different ways depending on whether the shock occurs from a shift in 
retail demand, farm supply or marketing inputs. Events that increase (decrease) the demand for 
food will reduce the retail-farm price ratio, and percentage marketing margin, if marketing inputs 
are more (less) elastic in supply than farm products. Events that increase (decrease) the supply of 
farm products will increase (decrease) the retail-farm price ratio. Events that increase (decrease) 
the supply of marketing inputs will decrease (increase) the retail-farm price ratio. Specific results 
concern the retail-farm price ratio under the impact of price control for an output good and price 
control for an agricultural input. According to these results, an effective price ceiling on retail 
food will reduce the price of farm products (unless the supply of farm products is perfectly 
elastic). Retail-farm price ratio will increase (decrease) if the elasticity of supply of farm 
products is less (greater) than that of marketing inputs. Supporting the price of farm products 
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above the unrestricted market equilibrium level will reduce the retail-farm price ratio. Some 
additional results report that the farm-level demand for agricultural products will be more or less 
elastic than the retail demand for food as elasticity of substitution is correspondingly greater or 
less than retail demand elasticity. The last investigations of Gardner‟s (1975) study concern the 
farmer‟s share of the food dollar. The percentage price spread is analytically distinct from the 
farmer‟s share of the food dollar, and the two will behave differently under changing market 
conditions unless the elasticity of substitution between inputs equals zero. If this elasticity equals 
one, the farmer‟s share is constant. If it is greater than one, an increase in the marketing margin 
will be accompanied by an increase in the farmer‟s share of the food dollar. Otherwise, lower 
margins go together with an increased farmer‟s share. The elasticity of substitution between farm 
products and marketing inputs in producing retail food can be estimated by dividing observed 
changes in the farmer‟s share of the food dollar by observed changes in the ratio of farm to retail 
food prices.  
In this study Gardner (1975) developed a system of equations which formally allow to explain 
what happen to the farm-retail price ratio in each circumstance, namely under the conditions of 
food demand shift, farm supply shift, marketing input supply shift. Such analysis is important for 
trade policy to understand the size and welfare effects of the price changes occurring on different 
levels of the food chain. Gardner (1975) also pointed out that, apart from other causes, 
incomplete farm-to-retail price ratio might be the result of government intervention to support 
producer prices.  
Studies working with the EDM approach traditionally refer to Gardner (1975) and often extend 
his model for new assumptions. For example, the study of Heien (1980) assumes that the supply 
and demand are not in balance and that this imbalance is the determining factor causing price 
changes in auction-type markets. Heien (1980) makes this because he attempts to put forth a 
theory of food price determination which is consistent with Gardner‟s (1975) model, but which 
goes beyond it and describes the dynamics of the sector. The dynamics is described by a simple 
inequality of supply and demand, indicating that they are not continuously in balance. The whole 
marketing chain price system is moved by the cycle of different time periods. Thus, the solution 
properties of the model allow for convergent growth and damped and explosives cycles. Another 
novelty of Heien‟s (1980) study is that the change in retail food price is modeled to be caused by 
changes in prices at lower levels in the marketing chain. Heien (1980) extends Gardner‟s (1975) 
framework by adding up a wholesale level in addition to the retail and farm ones. This aspect is 
shown in the theoretical model and examined in the empirical part. Heien (1980) concludes that 
the cost change is transmitted via mark-up type pricing rules which he allows to be consistent 
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with the firm‟s optimization behavior. The mark-up type pricing rule is given by the condition of 
marginal costs equal to price, where price in its turn is equal to the sum of input prices each 
multiplied by the exogenous coefficient in a static case and endogenous coefficient in a dynamic 
case. Exogenous coefficients represent the physical units of input products needed to produce 
one output unit (Heien, p. 12). Endogenous coefficients represent values endogenous to the 
Gardner model which will change differentially depending on how farm and other inputs prices 
change as a result of various shifts in their basic determinants (Heien, pp. 13-14). 
 
A paper by Michael Wohlgenant (1989) contributes to the theory of derived demand and 
enriches the findings achieved before by Brandow (1962) and Gardner (1975). Brandow (1962) 
worked on derived demand elasticities, Gardner (1975) investigated the absolute amount of retail 
and farm elasticities in accordance with the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Wohlgenant 
(1989) discussed the absolute amount of farm demand elasticities in accordance with the 
elasticity of substitution between farm and marketing inputs. Wohlgenant (1989) proved that 
derived demand elasticities for farm outputs are considerably larger (in absolute value) than in a 
case when the assumption of fixed input proportions is imposed. 
2.2.2 Imperfect market structure as a determinant of price transmission 
Much research has been done investigating factors impacting the farm-retail price ratio; 
however, McCorriston et al. (1989) is one of the first, who started to model the market structure 
having an impact on price transmission. In the study (1989), they show that market power will 
reduce the degree of price transmission between the farm and retail stages. Thus, if downstream 
markets are imperfectly competitive price transmission is less than complete. This result was 
long expected in agricultural economics literature, as all previous investigations were done under 
the assumption of perfect competition. Thus, McCorriston et al. (1989) drew particular attention 
to the market structure as one of the determinants of price transmission, and boosted the number 
of studies modeling imperfect competition scenarios in food markets. McCorriston‟s (1989) 
proxy variable for imperfect competition arises from the profit maximization condition and 
implies a ratio of marginal increase in the industry-produced quantity and a marginal increase in 
the quantity produced by a single firm. This ratio includes the reaction of the rivals to the 
marginal increase in the output of a single firm.
1
 In this model (1989) McCorriston et al. assume 
different scenarios for this ratio and set up its values exogenously. Holloway (1991), however, 
                                                 
1
 , where  is the proxy variable for imperfect competition and   measures 
the output reaction of its rivals to a change in its own output.  is the industry produced quantity and  is the 
quantity produced by a single firm. 
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offers to model it endogenously. The main goal of the Holloway‟s study is to find out how 
Gardner‟s model (1975) may be extended to allow for non-competitive behavior in food 
marketing. The objectives of Holloways‟ (1991) study are to provide a conceptual framework for 
the analysis of imperfect competition and to assess the analytical consequences of non-
competitive behavior. The theoretical development focuses on the determinants of conduct using 
the term of conjectural elasticities. The magnitudes of these elasticities are determined by the 
two values of two market structure variables such as the responsiveness of demand for firms‟ 
products and the size of the fixed costs they incur upon entering the market. These two variables 
may generate perfectly competitive equilibrium, or equilibrium which may diverge from the one 
obtained from the perfect competition. Holloway (1991) concludes that the dynamics of conduct 
in the food industries may be extremely important in explaining price movements at both the 
farm and retail levels. Schroeter and Azzam (1990) paper provides a conceptual and empirical 
framework for analyzing marketing margins in a noncompetitive food-processing industry facing 
output price uncertainty. One of the major results of their model is that one must consider the 
possibility of non-competitive conduct in the industry when estimating marketing margins, and 
that the output price uncertainty is a significant factor in determination the marketing margins.  
The recent study of McCorriston et al. (2001) pushed forward the assumption of the market 
structure impact on price transmission. It shows that price transmission may be greater in 
industries with increasing returns to scale than in markets characterised by constant returns to 
scale (both compared whether under perfect or imperfect competition circumstances, 
respectively). They proved that the industry returns to scale may either reinforce or offset the 
impact of market power in this industry. Therefore, the major contribution of McCorriston et al. 
(1989; 2001) is the theoretically proven definition of market power and returns to scale as the 
factors impacting the degree of price transmission.  
2.2.3. Price transmission in different production conditions 
Studies investigating the farm-retail price relationship usually assume a single output. Salhofer 
and Sinnabell (1999) note that the assumption of a single output is very simple and it can be 
extended in all directions. The assumption of a single output restricts findings to a particular case 
of a single output, while multiple outputs are a common case in empirical situations. An example 
of multiple outputs is a dairy industry, which produces goods-complements in production such as 
butter and skim milk powder or cheese and whey, however, both groups present the example of 
goods-substitutes in production, such as cheese and butter. Dairy processors have constantly to 
make a choice which goods to produce, butter and skim milk powder or cheese and whey. This 
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decision depends as well on the values of price transmissions of these goods, which in their tern 
depend, first, on the impact of different parameters (such as for example market power) on price 
transmission and, second, on the impact of other multiple outputs, such as goods-substitutes and 
goods-complements in production. If a dairy processor is able to apply market power he or she 
would certainly choose to produce such goods among the goods-substitutes, i. e. butter and 
cheese, which price transmission is lower in order to achieve the highest profit.  
However, there are no studies to our knowledge which model and estimate price transmission 
incorporating characteristics of multiple outputs as the principal determinants of the degree of 
price transmission likely to arise. Schroeter and Azzam (1991) note that a “single” output could 
potentially represent a set of multiple outputs produced in fixed proportions. In dairy industry 
multiple outputs include goods-complements in production (butter and skim milk powder or 
cheese and whey) and substitutes in production (butter and cheese). In order to estimate price 
transmission for goods-substitutes in production we first have to incorporate the impact of 
goods-compliments in production into the system. Our results show that the aggregated price 
transmission of goods-complements in production is not equal to price transmission of a single 
output, which means that the effect of goods-complements in production should be considered 
when estimating price transmission for goods-substitutes in production. This study thoroughly 
investigates the impact of goods-complements in production, which are also called jointly- 
produced goods.  
Economic literature defines the conception of jointly-produced goods and describes possible 
ways of economically modeling such production conditions (Fanno, 1974; Sraffa, 1960; 
Salvadory and Steedman, 1988; Schefold, 2005; etc.). Fanno (1974) defines joint outputs as 
generated spontaneously from a single production process so that the increase in production of 
one good cannot take place without a simultaneous increase in production of the other good. 
Prices of such goods are based on the unit of measure of these products, while the global cost is 
based on the unit of global production. Global cost may be of the same kind as the unit of 
measure of finished products, but may also be different and therefore cannot be separated and 
distributed among the finished goods, so that the price of one jointly-produced good is only a 
part of the global cost, being directly dependent on the price of another joint good. In this study 
we show formally that the assumption of jointly-produced goods will affect the degree of price 
transmission. 
Some studies (Kinnukan and Forker, 1987; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; Aguiar and Santana, 
2002) estimate price transmission of dairy products by regressing farm-gate milk price on a 
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single dairy product, without considering the impact of its joint outputs. However, our study 
results show that under the same market conditions a different price transmission for jointly-
produced goods, than for a single output, is expected. In other words the value of price 
transmission of a dairy product should include the impact of goods produced in fixed proportions 
with this dairy product. For example, the estimated value of price transmission of butter should 
contain the impact of skim milk powder price, or the estimated value of price transmission of 
cheese should contain the impact of whey price, etc. 
This study does not only extend production conditions commonly used in previous studies on 
price transmissions, it also incorporates investigations on market structure and different kinds of 
elasticities impacting joint products‟ price transmission. Incorporating the assumption of jointly-
produced outputs into the theoretical framework of the model by McCorriston et al. (2001) we 
receive results for the same tasks as in McCorriston et al. (2001), however, for the jointly-
produced goods. Therefore to implicitly understand the conception, the tasks, and the 
methodology used in the study, we first delve into the discussion of the equilibrium displacement 
model (EDM) of McCorriston et al. (2001) in the coming chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
General structure of the equilibrium displacement model (EDM)  
by the example of the McCorriston et al. (2001) study 
 
The McCorriston et al. (2001) model presents the latest generation of the EDM, incorporating 
hypotheses about the factors impacting price transmission such as market power and non-
constant returns to scale. In this chapter we thoroughly discuss all steps of the modelling 
framework of this study and give a detailed description of the mathematical method.  
  
 
3.1. Market structure, input factors and an output commodity 
 
We describe here an equilibrium model where main agents of a vertical market chain interact for 
production and distribution of a certain product. It is assumed that among the three market 
agents, i.e. retailers, processors and producers, market power is applied only by processors (food 
industry). The food industry is assumed to be oligopolistic; however, for reasons of simplicity 
we assume that it does not exert the oligopsony power against the suppliers of inputs 
(producers). We assume a high number of retailers as well as agricultural producers, operating in 
the market. 
 
Figure 1 indicates the oligopolistic food industry (a cartel case), which does not exert oligopsony 
power against the supply of inputs. Food industry marginal revenue curve is a curve marginal to 
the retail demand. From the food industry marginal revenue curve, subtract marginal costs to get 
perceived marginal revenue net of marginal costs, which in the bilateral price-taking case is the 
food industry-derived demand curve for an agricultural input. Agricultural input quantity and 
price are determined as the coordinates of the point on the intersection of agricultural input 
supply and food industry demand for an agricultural input.  
 
Retail price is the final demand price R at quantity Q A, where Q is the output quantity, and A 
is the agricultural input quantity
2
. The task of the model is to find the price transmission under 
the given market structure when agricultural input supply shifts. Thus, the value of price 
                                                 
2
 For graphical simplicity we assume that Q A, which means that agricultural input quantity is transformed into the 
output quantity. However, in the model assumptions Q is not   to A because output is assumed to be produced by 
two inputs, i.e. agricultural and material inputs.  
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transmission is calculated as a percentage change in the output price divided by the percentage 
change in the input price.  
($/unit)
Quantity (units)
Agricultural 
input supply
P
Food industry demand
for an agricultural input
R
Retail demand
Food industry
marginal revenue curve
Shifted
agricultural
input supply
R‘
P‘
Q  Q‘   
P (P‟) – agricultural input price before a shift (after a shift) 
R (R‟) – output product price before a shift (after a shift) 
Q (Q‟) – output quantity before a shift (after a shift) 
Figure 1 Vertical price transmission in a non-competitive downstream market affected by 
shifted input supply 
Source: adapted from Schroeter, Azzam and Zhang (2000) 
 
 
Demand for inputs 
 
This food industry uses agricultural inputs in combination with other variable inputs, e.g., 
material inputs. In case of butter production, milk may serve an example of agricultural input, 
and separating equipment is an example of material input. Demands for agricultural and material 
inputs are derived by the cost minimisation procedure. This is because firms seek to produce the 
required amount of an output using minimum amounts of inputs. The cost minimisation 
procedure is achieved by the Lagrange-multiplier method. Minimise total input costs: 
)min( WMPA  subject to the following constraints: QMAf ),( , where P is the price of the 
agricultural product, A is the quantity of agricultural product, W is the price of material input, 
and M is the quantity of material input. 
 
)),(( MAfQСWMPAL   (1) 
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Differentiating by A will give the optimal amount of agricultural input, or the agricultural input 
demanded: 
,
0
A
A
СfP
СfP
A
L




 
 
(2) 
         
where Af  defines the output product increase caused by the increase of an agricultural input for a 
unit, and С  is marginal costs (for this see the proof in Chiang, 1967a).  
 
Differentiating by M will give the optimal amount of material input, or the material input 
demanded: 
,
0
M
M
СfW
СfW
M
L




 
 
(3) 
 
where Mf  defines the output product increase caused by the increase of the material input for a 
unit.  
            
Thus, we received the agricultural input demand function: AfCP  , and the material input 
demand function: MfCW  , where C is marginal costs. Converting these demand functions 
into a logarithmic form (percentage changes) will give correspondingly:  
 
AfdCdPd lnlnln   (4) 
.lnlnln MfdCdWd   (5) 
 
Empirical studies concerning imperfect competition traditionally assume constant marginal costs 
of a firm; however, ignoring the fact that the firm‟s degree of market power depends on the 
nature of the firm‟s costs. Morrison Paul (1999) notes that mark-up models are often based on 
constructing products„ demand functions without detailed consideration of the underlying cost 
structure. In fact, constant returns to scale are often assumed, thus, ignoring the potential linkage 
between scale economies and mark-up behaviour. However, there are some empirical studies 
(Strak and Morgan, 1995; Millan, 1999; Allen et al., 1998) highlighting the importance of 
economies of scale in considered food industries. Therefore to check for the principal impact of 
the economies of scale on price transmission elasticity, we incorporate returns to scale 
parameter   into the firm‟s demand function (equations 6 and 7).  
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Wohlgenant (1999) shows that a positive relationship between the aggregate price spread and the 
agricultural raw material price could result from input substitution between the agricultural input 
and other inputs in response to changes in the agricultural input price. As some empirical studies 
have proved that input substitution is significant for food industries (Wohlgenant, 1989; 
Goodwin and Brester, 1995), we incorporate the parameter of input substitution into the 
modelling framework (equations 6 and 7).  
 
Thus, the final demand functions for agricultural and material inputs, respectively, are: 
QdMdAdCdPd ln
)1(
)lnln(lnln



 
  
                                                    (6) 
QdMdAdCdWd ln
)1(
)lnln(lnln



 
  
                                                         (7) 
 
      
where ( QdMdAd ln
)1(
)lnln(



 
 ) is achieved from ( Afd ln ),  
and ( QdMdAd ln
)1(
)lnln(



 
 ) is achieved from ( Mfd ln ). 
P and W are prices for agricultural and material inputs, respectively; A and M are quantities of 
agricultural and material inputs, respectively;  and   are output elasticities with   ; 
 is the (short-run) returns to scale measure with   greater than (equal to, less than) unity 
representing increasing (constant, decreasing) returns to scale and   is the elasticity of 
substitution between agricultural and material inputs. For the details of these transformations, see 
Appendix 1. 
 
Supply of inputs 
 
In perfect competition, single producers have no effect on equilibrium prices; however, 
aggregated supply needs not to be perfectly elastic. For the inverse aggregated supply for 
agricultural (A) and material (M) inputs, the following functions are assumed: 
 
),( ZAkP   (8) 
),(MgW   (9) 
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where P and W are prices of A and M respectively. The variable Z is the exogenous shift factor. 
We assume that the shock (Z) representing the impact such as bad weather or a tax on 
agricultural input occurs in the agricultural sector, thus, displacing the market to a new 
equilibrium.  
 
Equations (8) and (9) are converted into the logarithmic form (Appendix 2). Inverse input supply 
functions in the logarithmic form are: 
 
ZdAdPd lnlnln    (10) 
,lnln MdWd   (11) 
   
where dlnP and dlnW are percentage changes in prices for agricultural and material inputs, 
respectively and dlnA and dlnM are percentage changes in quantities of agricultural and material 
inputs, respectively. dlnZ is a percentage change in the shock affecting agricultural production. 
 ,   and   are input supply elasticities.  
 
Output demand 
Agricultural and material inputs generate a single homogenous output commodity. A large 
number of consumers buy this output commodity from the oligopolistic food industry. The 
inverse demand function of the output commodity is given by: 
 
),(QhR   (12) 
 
where R is the price of the output commodity and Q is the output quantity. 
  
Totally differentiating the given demand function and converting it to a logarithmic form yields: 
 
,lnln RdQd    (13) 
 
where dlnQ is the percentage change in the output product, dlnR is the percentage change in 
price for the output product and   is the industry elasticity of demand, given with the absolute 
value. A detailed conversion of (12) to (13) is given in Appendix 3.  
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3.2. Specification of the processing technology and the output supply function 
 
Two inputs (agricultural and material) are transformed into the output product by the processing 
industry‟s production technology. Following the common tool of the EDM framework, we give 
here a general form of production function, which does not represent any specific form of 
production function, but just indicates the fact of the existence of this production function.  We 
assume that this industry is represented by n number of firms, which all have identical 
production functions. The common production function of this output is homogenous of 
degree  , i.e., doubling the amounts of inputs will increase the output quantity by 2 .  
 
Capital can also be potentially considered in the production function. However, as we assume the 
capital to be fixed in the short run, and this specification is consistent with the short run 
equilibrium, capital is not included in the modelling framework. Production function is assumed 
to allow for inputs substitutability. Let us then write the production function as follows: 
 
),,( MAfQ    (14) 
 
where A stands for an agricultural input, M stands for material input. 
Totally differentiating this production function and converting it to the logarithmic form yields: 
 
,lnlnln MdAdQd    (15) 
 
where dlnQ is the percentage change in the output product; dlnA and dlnM are the percentage 
changes in the agricultural and material inputs, respectively and  and   are the output 
elasticities. The conversion procedure of the production function into the logarithmic form is 
shown in Appendix 4. 
 
 
3.3. Market forms and firms behaviour 
 
According to the model assumptions, market power should have an impact on price transmission. 
To implement this assumption into the model, we assume the oligopolistic food industry. 
Oligopolies tend to maximize their profits. Thus, we obtain the first-order condition for profit 
maximisation to find the retail price on the downstream market.  
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 ,,,)( iiii QWPCQQR   (16) 
         
where  
 i - profit function of the i‟th firm 
)(QR - output product price 
iQ  - quantity of output product, produced by the i‟th firm 
iC  - costs of the i‟th firm 
P   - price of agricultural input 
W  - price of material input 
 
Knowing that the output price R is a market price depending on the whole industry‟s output Q, 
and this total output in its turn depends on each firm‟s output Qi ( 


n
i
iQQ
1
), we will hold the 
first-order condition for one firm‟s profit maximisation: 
 
 
,0
,,)(
)( 











i
ii
ii
i
i
i
i
Q
QWPC
Q
Q
QR
QR
Q
Q
Q
  
 
                                                      (17) 
    
where 
i
i
Q
Q


 , and is called conjectural variation parameter for firm i. With the conjectural 
variation parameter, we check for the relationship of the whole industry output to the output of 
one particular firm i. , where  is the proxy variable for 
imperfect competition and   measures the output reaction of its rivals to a change in its own 
output.  is the industry produced quantity and  is the quantity produced by a single firm. If 
reaction of the rivals is zero, the ratio is equal to one and implies a cournot oligopoly.
3
 If reaction 
of the rivals is bigger than zero, the ratio is bigger than one and implies a collusive outcome. If 
reaction of the rivals is minus one, the ratio is equal to zero and implies a perfect competition.  
 
                                                 
3
 McCorriston et al. (2001) name the case, when conjectural variations equal to one, a monopoly or collusive 
outcome outcome.  
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Assume n firms of the same size and identical cost structure, and sum the profit maximisation 
function over all of them (noting that 


n
i
iQQ
1
), will give:  
,CR       (18) 
where





n
n
, and C is marginal costs. For the detailed derivation of this outcome see 
Appendix 5.   
 
Thus, oligopoly condition here is the price R equal to marginal costs C multiplied by the industry 
mark-up coefficient  .   is the mark-up of price over costs, n is the number of firms in the food 
industry,   is the absolute value of the retail food price elasticity (
Q
R
R
Q



 ) and   is the 
aggregate conjectural variation or a market power parameter. Thus, the higher the conjectural 
variation or market power parameter  , the higher the mark-up of price over costs parameter  , 
and the higher the oligopoly price on the market R. We also assume that conjectural variation 
parameters are identical across all firms in the food industry. 
 
Condition CR    is an equilibrium condition for a non-competitive (oligopoly) outcome. As 
the food industry is oligopolistic, the price the consumer pays is higher than the marginal costs of 
the processor and is equal to CR   , where   is a mark-up charged by the oligopolist and C 
implicates marginal costs. 
 
 
3.4. Solution techniques  
 
The EDM approach uses a standard set of partial equilibrium solution techniques such as 
equilibrating supply and demand on production and distribution levels and then solving the 
system of equilibrium equations.  
 
Modelling the input market equilibrium, we equate input demand functions (6) and (7) with input 
supply functions (10) and (11). The input markets clearing conditions converted into a 
logarithmic form then yield the following for agricultural and material inputs, respectively:  
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QdMdAdCdZdAd ln
)1(
)lnln(lnlnln






  
 
(19) 
.ln
)1(
)lnln(lnln QdMdAdCdMd






  
 
(20) 
 
If we replace Cd ln  (indicated in equations (19) and (20)) with the fraction Rd ln)1(  , we 
will confirm that the marginal costs for each of the industry‟s inputs are derived from the 
industry output price R (derivation of RdCd ln)1(ln   is given in Appendix 6). Thus, we 
receive (21) and (22): 
 
RdMdAdZd ln)1(ln)1(ln)1(ln
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(21) 
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)1(
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

 
 
(22) 
 
Detailed transformation procedures for the above equations are shown in Appendixes 7 and 8. 
 
Modelling the output market equilibrium we equate the quantity of output supplied to the 
downstream market ),( MAfQ  with the inverse output demand function )(QhR  . The 
output market clearing condition, converted into a logarithmic form, then yields: 
 
.lnlnln0 RdMdAd      (23) 
 
As a result, we conclude with the system of equilibrium conditions: 
(a) Agricultural input clearing condition 
RdMdAdZd ln)1(ln)1(ln)1(ln
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  (24) 
 (for derivation see Appendix 7). 
(b) Material input clearing condition 
MdAdRd ln
)1(
ln
)1(
ln
)1(
0 

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 (25) 
(for derivation see Appendix 8). 
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(c) Output clearing condition 
.lnlnln0 RdMdAd    (26) 
 
Focusing on the measure of price transmission from the farm-gate to the retail level, we derive 
solutions for two endogenous variables: farm gate price for the agricultural input and the output 
product price. We assume that the exogenous shock Z arises in the agricultural sector and, thus, 
influences the price transmission elasticity from the side of the agricultural supply. The 
procedure for deriving the price transmission elasticity is then to solve the system of equilibrium 
equations (a), (b) and (c) following the shock Z, which occurred in the agricultural sector. 
 
 
3.5. Price transmission elasticity 
 
Solving the system of equilibrium equations yields solutions for the output commodity price R, 
and the agricultural input price P, respectively: 
  
   )1()1()1()1(
ln1
ln




 Zd
Rd  
 (27) 
 
     
   )1()1()1()1(
11)1(
ln





Pd  
(28) 
 
 
The expression for the farm to retail price transmission affected by the exogenous shock in the 
agricultural sector is given by the following ratio:
Zd
Pd
Zd
Rd
ln
ln
/
ln
ln
. After certain simplifications 
(shown in Appendix 9), price transmission elasticity between agricultural input and output 
product prices is described as follows:  
 
 
      
,
11
1
lnln
lnln





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ZdPd
ZdRd
 
 
                                                  (29) 
 
where dlnP is the percentage change in the agricultural price, dlnR is the percentage change in 
the output commodity price,   and   are output elasticities with   ,   is the returns to 
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scale measure,   is the elasticity of substitution between  agricultural and material inputs,   is 
the inverse elasticity of supply of material inputs,   is the absolute value of the retail elasticity 
of demand and   is the elasticity of the industry mark-up. 
 
Following the assumption that the food industry is characterized by the non-constant returns to 
scale, we define the output elasticities  and   as the shares of inputs in the industry cost 
function AS  and MS , taken according to the cost structure   of the given industry: 
  
 AS  (30) 
,
M
S  (31) 
 
where AS  ( MS ) is the share of agricultural (material) inputs in the industry cost function.  
Then, the price transmission equation can be rewritten as: 
 
 
       .)1(111
1



A
S
A
S
A
S


  
 
(32) 
 
Let us analyse the received equation according to the study task. The first task tends to examine 
the impact the market power parameter has on the price transmission elasticity. Looking for this 
impact, we compare two cases: price transmission in the competitive benchmark (where 0 ), 
and in the non-competitive benchmark (where 0 ). Set up market power parameter equal to 
zero and the returns to scale parameter equal to one to receive the competitive benchmark for 
price transmission elasticity: 
 
 
  .)1(1
1
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

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A
S
A
S
c


  
 
(33) 
 
Now find the ratio of  /C  to check for the market power impact: 
 
  
  .)1(1
)1()1(/)1()1(
1

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  
 
(34) 
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To see the impact of the market power parameter more clearly, we set 0 : 
./)1(1 


C  
 
              (35) 
 
If the industry is characterised by the constant returns to scale ( 1 ),    determines the extent 
of the price transmission elasticity‟s deviation from the competitive benchmark:  1/C . 
With   > 0 and n relatively small, C  will exceed 
4
.  
 
McCorriston et al. (2001) confirm that the impact of market power on price transmission is 
unambiguous, thus the increase in market power leads to the decrease of price transmission. 
However, they do not show it technically, for example, differentiating the price transmission 
equation by the proxy of market power. We offer to use J  as a proxy, representing the degree of 
market power, where nJ /  is an adjusted Lerner index5. Partially differentiating the equation 
(32) by J  gives the equation (36), which is less than zero. This proves that the increase in 
market power leads to the decrease in price transmission elasticity:  
where 
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A
SJJ
A
S . Thus, with a higher number of 
firms in the industry, the degree of price transmission will increase.   
 
Let us now check which impact has a cost structure of the industry on price transmission. We 
assume a perfectly competitive case to eliminate the impact of market structure and to examine 
the impact of cost structure alone. When 0 , the ratio of  /)1(1/ C (achieved 
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corresponding demand elasticity, is equal to nL /  . Both nJ /  and the elasticity of demand   in (36) 
represent the absolute value.  
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(36) 
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from equation 35). Now, if 1  (the food industry is characterised by increasing returns to 
scale), then 1/  C . In other words, the price transmission elasticity in the industry, 
characterised by increasing returns to scale, is higher than in the industry, characterised by 
constant returns to scale. The same is true for the opposite case: if 1 , then 1/  C , and the 
price transmission under decreasing returns to scale is lower than under the constant returns to 
scale.  
The impact of short-run returns to scale on the elasticity of price transmission can be readily 
confirmed by differentiating (32) with respect to  : 
        ,2/11111 

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d
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where         ,1111 
A
S
A
S 
 
assuming 0  
  21




 AS
d
d
 .                (38) 
 
Apart from these findings, one more effect is detected, i.e. price transmission in an imperfectly 
competitive industry operating in the increasing returns to scale environment could be higher 
than in a perfectly competitive industry with constant returns to scale. Thus, the role of   may 
either reinforce or offset the impact of market power.  
 
Elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs 
McCorriston et al. (2001) study the impact of the elasticity of substitution on price transmission 
by changing this parameter‟s value from 0.5 to 0.25. This leads them to the conclusion that the 
decrease in its value causes a decline in price transmission elasticity. The technical analysis 
below proves this result for the rest of the possible parameter values.  
 
The impact of the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs on price 
transmission is given as follows: 
 
where 
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Knowing that 1AS , when the expression in the brackets (40)   





    (40) 
is greater than zero, then 0


d
d
. This means that the increase in the elasticity of substitution 
between agricultural and material inputs will lead to the increase in price transmission. 
Expression (40) cannot be lower than zero, because in this case the whole equation (32) becomes 
negative. This, however, is not allowed, as price transmission elasticity can be interpreted only in 
positive signs. Expression (40) can also not be equal to zero, because in this case price 
transmission will be zero. Therefore parameter   will contribute only to the increase in price 
transmission.  
 
In a special case of constant returns to scale ( 1 ), the increase in the elasticity of substitution 
of agricultural and material inputs will lead to the increase in price transmission:   
    ,2/11 
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(41) 
 
 
Elasticity of supply of material input 
The description of the impact of the supply of material input on price transmission in 
McCorriston et al. (2001) is limited by changing this parameter‟s value from 0.5 to 1, which 
shows that increase in the elasticity of substitution of material input leads to the increase in price 
transmission. Our analysis shows that there are some additional results which show that the 
impact of the elasticity of supply of material input on price transmission is ambiguous. Equation 
(42) implicates that the increase in the elasticity of supply of material input will lead to the 
increase in price transmission with smaller values for   and  .  
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equation (42) will be greater than zero. Thus, we conclude that when retail demand is inelastic, 
the increase in the elasticity of supply of material‟s input will raise price transmission. However, 
when retail demand is more elastic, namely, its value is higher than equation (43), the increase in 
the elasticity of supply of material‟s input will reduce price transmission.  
 
In a special case of constant returns to scale ( 1 ) and industry, characterised by perfect 
competition ( 0 ), increase in the elasticity of supply of material input will lead to the increase 
in price transmission elasticity only if elasticity of substitution between inputs is greater than 
price elasticity of demand (   ). This is because (42) will be reduced to (44): 
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Price  elasticity of demand 
McCorriston et al. (2001) demonstrate the impact of the price elasticity of demand on price 
transmission only by reducing the value of this parameter from 0.4 to 0.2. We prolong this 
analysis in a technical variant by differentiating equation (32) with respect to  . This gives an 
ambiguous result: 
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(46) 
 
this expression will be greater than zero and equation (45) will be lower than zero. This means 
that with degrees of returns to scale lower than (46), an increase in the elasticity of demand will 
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lead to a decrease in price transmission. On the other hand, when returns to scale are higher than 
(46), an increase in the elasticity of demand will lead to an increase in price transmission.  
 
In a special case of constant returns to scale ( 1 ), an increase in the elasticity of demand will 
lead to a decrease in price transmission:   
.
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Eventually, increasing returns to scale contributes to the increase in price transmission elasticity 
when elasticity of retail demand increases. The increase in the elasticity of demand reduces the 
impact of the monopoly power, and therefore certainly leads to the increase in price 
transmission. On the other hand, an industry under constant and decreasing returns to scale 
contributes to the decrease in price transmission elasticity when elasticity of retail demand 
increases. 
 
 
3.6. Numerical application of model results and a sensitivity analysis 
 
In the previous section we received the resulting equation for price transmission elasticity, and 
discussed the main tendencies of its changes. According to it, monopoly mark-up tends to reduce 
price transmission, while increasing returns to scale increase the transmission of prices, thus 
offsetting even the effect of imperfect competition. McCorriston et al. (2001) illustrate 
numerically the magnitudes of these effects. We repeat this procedure, first, with parameter 
values given in McCorriston et al., and, second, with different parameter values for some more 
investigations.  
 
Table 1 below highlights the comparison of resulting transmission elasticities given in 
McCorriston et al. (2001) and recalculated in the current study. Impacts of market structure and 
functional forms of the demand curve are also presented in Table 1. The adjustment on the 
demand side depends on the functional form of the demand curve. To catch up the effect of the 
functional forms two types of demand curves are considered: linear and log-linear forms. The 
log-linear form implies that the demand function has a constant elasticity, the derivative of which 
is equal to zero, i.e. 0ln/ln  Rdd  , thus, 0/ 







  n . In other words, the impact of 
market power in a case of constant elasticity of demand is eliminated.  
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With the linear demand function, perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and an 
agricultural input share equal to 0.5, price transmission elasticity for agricultural input is equal to 
0.51. This implies that in a perfect competition and constant returns to scale case the price 
transmission of each input is equal to its share in the industry costs function.  
 
Table 1 Comparison of price transmission elasticities under different parameter values 
assumed by McCorriston et al. and in the current study  
 
 McCorriston et al. 
(2001) 
Present study 
 Price transmission (linear demand) 
 (1) (3) (4) 
Perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale 
 
 
0.510 
 
0.522 
 
0.524 
Imperfect competition and 
constant returns to scale 
 
0.322 
 
0.347 
 
0.347 
Imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale 
 
0.341 
 
0.520 
 
0.529 
Parameter values 
Elasticity of the industry mark-
up ( ) 
 
0.636 
 
0.636 
 
0.636 
Elasticity of supply of material 
input ( ) 
 
0.5 
 
1.5 
 
1.8 
Increasing returns to scale (  )  
1.25 
 
  
 
  
 
where 5.0)( MSAS ,  = 1 for constant returns to scale,  = 1.25 and  =
  for increasing returns to scale; 
 =0.5; =0.4.  
 
Due to imperfect competition, price transmission elasticity is reduced from 0.510 to 0.322. This 
result leads to a conclusion that with a lower degree of monopoly mark-up in the industry, price 
transmission will show higher values. 
 
Increasing returns to scale contribute to the increase in price transmission elasticity from 0.322 to 
0.341. In the log-linear demand case, the effect of increasing returns to scale is more dramatic: it 
lets the price transmission in imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (0.560) over-
shift the price transmission in a perfect competition case (0.510). This shows that price 
transmission in a constant elasticity of demand case is higher under increasing returns to scale 
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than under constant returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale increase price transmission 
elasticity. Over-shifting implies that the output price decreased more than the input price did. 
Thus, with the log-linear demand in the industry, characterised by increasing returns to scale, 
output price decreased more than input price.  
 
The McCorriston et al. study shows the over-shifting only for the log-linear demand case. We 
attempt to simulate a linear demand case for the over-shifting. Simulation results in Table 1 
show that the over-shifting in a linear demand case is possible only if increasing returns to scale 
acquire a very big - and at the same time not realistic - value. Thus, if returns to scale equal to 
eternity and elasticity of supply of material input equals to 1.8, price transmission elasticity in 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (0.529) is higher than price transmission 
elasticity in perfect competition and constant returns to scale (0.524). In case the elasticity of 
supply of material input is equal to 1.5, price transmission in imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale (0.520) is almost complete with the case of perfect competition 
(0.522).  
 
Next, we simulate to check the effects of the rest of the parameters on price transmission 
elasticity. Results are presented in Table 2 and indicate the difference between the competitive 
case
6
 and the imperfect competition with increasing returns to scale case, taken in percentage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The competitive case stands for the price transmission elasticity under perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale (equation 33), estimated with a linear demand function.   
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Table 2 Results of the sensitivity analysis for major determinant parameters of the price 
transmission elasticity 
 
 Number of firms 
n=3 n=6 n=12 
(1) (2) (3) 
Deviation of imperfect 
competition with 
increasing returns to 
scale from perfect 
competition and 
constant returns to scale 
related to the number of 
firms (n=3, n=6, n=12), 
taken in percentage a  
 
-3.16 
 
11.75 
 
20.39 
2.0  ( 4.0 ) -32.88 -9.43 3.75 
001.0  ( 5.0 ) -13.25 0.03 7.72 
1  ( 5.0 ) 1.38 16.44 25.11 
5.1  ( 2 ) -9.71 3.12 10.44 
a
Price transmission elasticity for perfect competition and constant returns to scale are calculated using equation 
33 with the following parameter values: 5.0)( MSAS ,  =0.5,  =0.5, =0.4. The same parameters are used in 
deriving the imperfect competition transmission elasticity under increasing returns to scale with, in addition  =0.2 
and  = 2. The number of firms n=3, n=6, n=12 refer to the case of imperfect competition. The other entries in this 
table refer to the sensitivity to the extent of the deviation from the competitive transmission elasticity with constant 
returns to scale, when the parameters change.  
 
The first figure in Table 2 (top left) indicates that price transmission elasticity in the case of 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale is 3.16 per cent lower than the price 
transmission elasticity in the case of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The 
second, third, fourth and the fifth lines of Table 2 indicate the difference between transmission 
elasticity under perfect competition with constant returns to scale, and under imperfect 
competition with increasing returns to scale, the last taken with the changed parameters.  
 
The retail elasticity of demand,  , plays a significant role for the transmission elasticity from the 
farm to retail level. We change this elasticity only for the case of imperfect competition. The 
lower elasticity of retail demand (0.2 instead of 0.4) leads to the decline in price transmission 
elasticity; on the other hand, the increase in the retail demand elasticity leads to the increase in 
price transmission. The increase in the elasticity of demand reduces the impact of the monopoly 
power, and therefore certainly leads to the increase in price transmission, which is good for 
farmers and consumers. However, technical analysis in the section 3.5 of this chapter shows that 
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  will not always lead to the increase in price transmission. Thus, under certain conditions it 
may also lead to the decline in price transmission; as it is for example indicated in Table 3. The 
first figure in Table 3 (top left) indicates that price transmission elasticity in the case of imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale is 9 per cent lower than the price transmission 
elasticity in the case of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The second line in 
Table 3 indicates the difference between transmission elasticity under perfect competition with 
constant returns to scale, and under imperfect competition with increasing returns to scale, the 
last taken with the changed price elasticity of retail demand. Thus, we conclude that when 
returns to scale are higher (1.25), the decrease in the price elasticity of demand will decrease 
price transmission (the difference between the base case and considered case increases from 9 to 
22). However, when returns to scale are lower (0.4), the decrease in the price elasticity of 
demand will increase price transmission (the difference between the base case and considered 
case decreases from 46 to 40).  
 
 
Table 3 Impact of the elasticity of retail demand on price transmission 
 
 n = 5 
25.1  4.0  
(1) (2) 
Base case a  -9 -46 
2.0 (not 4.0 ) -22 -40 
a  For a detailed description of calculating the values implicated in this table see footnotes of Table 2. 
 
Simulations for collusive or monopoly outcome with demand elasticity greater than one, shown 
below in Table 4, confirm some of the results received with the demand elasticity equal to 0.4. 
Such results indicate that price transmission in imperfect competition and constant returns to 
scale is lower than under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However, price 
transmission elasticity in imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale may be equal to 
perfect competition case (if  =1.25), or may even over-shift (if  =1.5) the perfect competition 
case not only in the log-linear demand case, as McCorriston et al. (2001) show, but also in the 
case of a linear demand function (see Table 4).  
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Table 4 Comparison of price transmission elasticities when price elasticity of retail demand 
is lower and higher than one 
 
 McCorriston et al. (2001) Present study 
Price transmission (linear demand) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale 
 
0.510 
 
0.510 
 
0.446 
 
0.446 
Imperfect competition and 
constant returns to scale 
 
0.322 
 
0.322 
 
0.367 
 
0.367 
Imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale 
 
0.341 
 
0.356 
 
0.446 
 
0.521 
 Parameter values 
Price elasticity of demand ( )  
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
1.1 
 
1.1 
Increasing returns to scale (  )  
1.25 
 
1.5 
 
1.25 
 
1.5 
where 5.0)( MSAS ,  =0.5,  =0.5.  
 
 
A very small value of the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs is 
offered as a proxy for a situation in which the agricultural input may hardly be substituted with 
material input, e.g. milk and machinery in butter production. Therefore, in the analysis shown in 
Table 2, we set   to be very low ( 001.0 ) to look for consequences of such low 
substitutability for price transmission elasticity. According to the results, higher substitutability 
of inputs leads to an increase in price transmission. This implies that a farm‟s share in an output 
price is larger when the agricultural input is easily substituted with machinery, and lower when 
inputs are hardly substitutable. Technically the elasticity of substitution has a direct impact on 
the changes in price of agricultural input, and therefore has an impact on price transmission 
elasticity. Intuitively, the higher the substitutability between inputs, the higher the change in 
input price, the easier the changes in the input price occur, the higher the price transmission 
elasticity.  
 
Table 2 (column 1) shows that the over-shifting may occur not only because of the increasing 
returns to scale, but also due to other parameters changes such as, for example, the elasticity of 
supply of material input.  
 
According to the sensitivity results indicated in Table 2, the inverse elasticity of supply of 
material input,  , increases price transmission elasticity. This is good for farmers, because their 
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share of a retail good‟s price in this case increases. However, this result is not exhaustive. In 
section 3.5 of this chapter by technical analysis we show that the impact of elasticity of supply of 
material input on the price transmission elasticity depends on the interdependencies of the other 
parameters. The numerical example is illustrated in Table 5, below. The first figure in Table 5 
(top left) indicates that price transmission elasticity in the case of imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale is 9 percent lower than price transmission elasticity in the case of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The second line of Table 5 indicates the 
difference between transmission elasticity under perfect competition with constant returns to 
scale, and under imperfect competition with increasing returns to scale, the last taken with the 
changed elasticity of supply of material input. Thus, we conclude that when retail demand is 
inelastic (0.4), the increase in the elasticity of supply of material‟s input will raise price 
transmission (the difference between the base case and considered case decreases from 9 to 6). 
However, when retail demand is more elastic (0.8), the increase in the elasticity of supply of 
material‟s input will reduce price transmission (the difference between the base case and 
considered case increases from 1 to 3). This confirms the ambiguous impact of the elasticity of 
material input on price transmission.  
 
Table 5 Impact of the elasticity of supply of material inputs on price transmission 
 
  n = 5 
4.0  8.0  
(1) (2) 
Base case a  -9 -1 
1 ( 5.0 ) -6 -3 
a  For a detailed description of calculating the values implicated in this table see footnotes of Table 2. 
 
The impact of returns to scale parameter is indicated in Table 2. The value of returns to scale 
parameter decreases in the sensitivity analysis from 2 to 1.5 (Table 2), which leads to the decline 
of price transmission elasticity. These implications prove that the industry structure, namely, 
increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale, have a direct impact on price transmission 
elasticity. Increasing returns to scale increase price transmission. Decreasing returns to scale 
decrease price transmission (Table 2). This, in its turn, has an impact on farmers‟ and 
consumers‟ welfare. Thus, the industry, characterised by increasing returns to scale, contributes 
to farmers‟ and/or to consumer‟s income.  
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Results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that transmission elasticity is especially sensitive to the 
parameters that determine the mark-up elasticity (especially to the number of industry firms 
n ). Thus, varying the number of firms in the industry changes the transmission elasticity 
significantly (Table 2). Already with 6n  the price transmission elasticity with increasing 
returns to scale over-shifts the one of the competitive case and constant returns to scale by 11.75 
per cent. Over-shifting occurs due to increasing returns to scale. Within 12 industry firms and 
increasing returns to scale, the price transmission over-shifts the perfectly competitive case by 
20.39 per cent (Table 2).  
 
Table 6, below, referring to Table 2 in McCorriston et al. (2001), indicates recalculated values 
without parentheses, and figures, given in McCorriston‟s Table 2, in parentheses. 
 
Table 6 Comparison of recalculated results of sensitivity analysis and results displayed in 
McCorriston et al. (2001) 
 
 Number of firms 
n=2 n=5 n=10 
(1) (2) (3) 
Deviation of imperfect 
competition with increasing 
returns to scale from the 
competitive benchmark case 
-33 -9 0.3 (0.4) 
2.0  ( 4.0 ) -64  -22  -7  
25.0  ( 5.0 ) -36 (-26) -13  -5  
1  ( 5.0 ) -30 (-15) -1 (-6) 9 (3) 
125.1  ( 25.1 ) -34 (-24) -12  -4  
 
Note: Figures, given in parentheses are indicated in Table 2 in McCorriston et al., (2001). 
 
MCorriston (2001) state that decreasing returns to scale reduce price transmission elasticity, or in 
other words the smaller returns to scale, the lower price transmission elasticity. However, the 
figure given McCorristons‟ (2001) paper - in parentheses in the last line of the first column in 
Table 6 above (-24) - does not support this hypothesis, as it is higher than the elasticity of a 
perfect competition (a benchmark) case (-33). Our calculation shows that here the figure -34 
should present to indicate that lower returns to scale decrease price transmission elasticity. Our 
recalculation offer figure -30 instead of (-15) for the inverse elasticity of supply of material input 
  in the first column, -1 instead of (-6) in the second column, 9 instead of (3) in the third 
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column; -36 instead of (-26) for the elasticity of substitution of agricultural and material inputs 
 (column 1); and 0.3 instead of 0.4 for the deviation of imperfect competition with increasing 
returns to scale from the competitive benchmark case when n=10. 
 
In the footnotes to tables 1 and 2 in McCorriston et al. (2001), monopoly mark-up coefficient, 
 , has a value of 0.636 instead of 1.4. 
 
Summarising, the numerical sensitivity analysis proves two main hypotheses offered in the 
study. First, imperfect competition decreases price transmission elasticity. And second, the cost 
structure of the industry determines price transmission elasticity.  
 
Results, achieved by the discussed model, are extraordinary and in some sense unexpected, i.e. it 
proves that price transmission might be incomplete even under perfect competition. Thus, 
empirical findings (such as in Griffith and Piggott (1994); Peltzman (2000); etc.), showing that 
imperfect competition (market power) does not necessarily mean imperfect price transmission, 
or perfect competition in the industry does not necessarily lead to a complete price transmission, 
now have a theoretical background.  
  
Results achieved in this study might be successfully used for economic predictions, e.g., a farmer 
has to know that the lower the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs, 
the lower the price transmission elasticity for his agricultural output. A farmer, interested in 
economic predictions, should be aware of the nature of the industry he is dealing with. Thus, if 
he is dealing with an industry, characterised by increasing returns to scale, then an increase in the 
demand elasticity for the retail product will lead to an increase in price transmission of the 
agricultural output. On the other hand, if he is dealing with an industry, characterised by constant 
or decreasing returns to scale, then an increase in the demand elasticity for the retail product will 
lead to a decrease in price transmission of the agricultural output. Results of the model show that 
the impact of the elasticity of demand of material input on price transmission elasticity is 
difficult to predict, as it depends on the interaction of several parameters simultaneously.  
 
The McCorriston‟s et al. (2001) study did not achieve the boundaries of the EDM approach, 
however. This model might be a good starting point to research the new assumptions. We chose 
this model to investigate the issue of price transmission elasticity in joint production. In the next 
chapter we extend McCorriston‟s (2001) model for the case of two jointly-produced goods and 
discuss achieved results.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Price transmission for joint products 
 
 
4.1. Theoretical framework of the model “Price Transmission for Joint Products” 
 
We concentrate on the example of dairy products to check for the price transmission elasticity in 
the case of joint production. For that, we assume a number of milk processing firms producing 
two homogenous products, goods-complements in production such as butter and skim milk 
powder. These firms together form a dairy industry. The industry produces two joint products 
using two independent inputs, such as milk and all kinds of other material inputs (creamer 
equipment, labour, etc.). To keep the algebra manageable, all other inputs apart from milk are 
subsumed into a single “material” input. The assumption of a Leontief production technology for 
the milk-processing sector appears acceptable because the possibilities for substituting material 
inputs for milk in response to changing factor prices are limited, especially in the short-run 
situation considered here. We assume capital inputs to be fixed due to the considered short-run 
term frame. Among the three agents existing in the market (e.g. producers, processors and 
retailers), market power is applied only by processors (dairy industry). The dairy industry is 
assumed to be oligopolistic, while not exerting the oligopsony power against the suppliers of 
inputs (producers). The interactions between firms are modelled through the use of conjectural 
variations. In deriving the price transmission elasticity, we assume that the agricultural input 
exogenously shifts. This is, however, not restrictive; the model could be extended for a shift in 
material input as well. The model flow is displayed in the Figure 2, below. 
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Figure 2 Set-up of the model
7
 
Note: The system of equations (A.8b), (A.18)-(A.22) in Appendix 10 forms the clearing conditions presented on the 
right side of this figure. 
 
This study extends the model of McCorriston et al. (2001) for the case of two jointly-produced 
outputs. To economise on the algebraic implications, a parsimonious description of the model is 
used. The inverse demand functions for the two jointly-produced outputs are respectively given 
by 
 
)( 111 QkP   (48) 
),( 222 QkP   (49) 
 
where 1P  is the price of the first output and 2P  is the price of the second output. 1Q  and 2Q  are 
the quantities of the corresponding goods. As these two outputs are produced in fixed 
proportions, one output is the function of the other:  21 * QfQ  . 
 
                                                 
7
 Where 
2
,
1
QQ  are the quantities of the output goods and Q is the quantity of the throughput. 
2
,
1
PP  are prices of 
the output goods, C is the marginal joint costs variable. A and M are quantities of agricultural and material inputs, X 
and Y are prices of agricultural and material inputs, respectively. 
A
f  and 
M
f  are marginal products of agricultural 
and material inputs, respectively.  
),,,()()( 21222111 iiiiii QQYXCQQPQQP 
 
Joint production 
function 
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The dairy industry joint production function is a combination of the production function 
),( MAfQ   and the transformation function ),( 21 QQgQ  , and is given by 
 
),,(),( 21 MAfQQg   (50) 
 
where A  stands for an agricultural input, M stands for material input and Q  is a throughput 
between the inputs and the final outputs. The joint production function is assumed to be 
homogenous of degree  .  
 
The input supply functions in the inverse form for the agricultural (A) and material (M) inputs 
are given by the following equations 
 
),( ZAhX   (51) 
)(* MhY   (52) 
 
where X and Y are the prices of A and M, and Z represents the exogenous shock in the 
agricultural sector (e.g. the drought or foot-mouth decease).  
 
The dairy industry has oligopolistic structure. Processing firms maximize profits. In the joint 
production case the oligopolies‟ profit equals to the difference between the total gross return and 
the total cost. The total gross return in the case of two goods produced jointly comes from the 
sum of partial returns on 1Q  and 2Q  (Fanno, 1974). We also assume that all n firms in the 
industry have identical profit maximization functions given by 
 
),,,,()()( 21222111 iiiiii QQYXCQQPQQP   (53) 
 
The first-order condition with respect to the throughput is 
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where iQ  is a throughput, which is a function of inputs, represented by milk and material inputs, 
which is modelled as a transformation function of two jointly-produced goods. Parameters 
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 are the technical coefficients representing the share of the 
first and the second jointly-produced outputs in the throughput, respectively.
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 1  is the conjectural variation parameter for the processing firm i. For 0  
the markets for jointly-produced goods are perfectly competitive, while 1  implies a cournot 
oligopoly and 1  implies monopoly or collusive outcome. Given that the parameter of 
conjectural variation is a proxy for the behavioural aspect of oligopoly, it might stay constant, 
even when the number of firms in the industry changes. The same applies for the second market. 
If n firms in the industry are of an equal-size with identical cost structures, then 
nQ
Q
Q
Q ii 1
2
2
1
1  . 
Thus, we receive the n-firms oligopolistic industry profit maximization condition given by 
 
21 PCP   , (55) 
 
where )/( 1111  kknn   is a market power mark-up, that reflects the industry mark-up of 
price over costs, 2222 /)(  nkkn   is a pass-through coefficient from the second product‟ 
price to the first product‟s price. We assume that   is the aggregate conjectural variation 
parameter of the dairy industry, which is identical across all firms in this industry. n is the 
number of firms in the industry, 1 and 2  are demand elasticities for the two jointly-produced 
outputs, and 1k  is a fixed ratio between a throughput and a first output, representing the share of 
one firm‟s first output in the throughput of this firm. The same is true for 2k , respectively. 
 
 
4.2. Price transmission elasticity of a joint product and its main determinants 
 
We derive the price transmission elasticity for the first jointly-produced output ( 1E ) by solving 
the equations (48) to (55) following the exogenously occurring shock Z in the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
8
 Because the relationship between 
i
Q  and iQ1  is fixed, they will change in constant proportion to each other. Thus, 
we say that the ratio iQiQ  /1  represents the share of  iQ1  in i
Q . The throughput 
i
Q  is not only a function of 
agricultural and material inputs, it is also an aggregate product of two jointly-produced outputs.  
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Appendix 10 describes the derivation procedure of the price transmission elasticity for the first 
jointly-produced output, which is given by 
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Note: D is the denominator, given in Appendix 10 in equation A.10.25 
 
(56) 
 
where Sa is the share of agricultural input in the industry cost function, defined as  /Sa .   
is the output elasticity for agricultural input and is equal to   ,   is the output elasticity 
for the material input, and   is the (short-run) returns to scale parameter which is greater than 
(equal to, less than) unity representing increasing (constant, decreasing) returns to scale.   is the 
elasticity of the industry mark-up and is equal to )/( 11   n  with 1  representing the 
change in the elasticity of demand of the first product for a given change in the retail price of this 
product.   is the pass-through elasticity from the second product‟s price to the first product‟s 
price, and is equal to )/( 22
  n  with 2  representing the change in the elasticity of 
demand of the second product for a given change in the retail price of this product.   is the 
elasticity of substitution between agricultural and materials inputs, which is equal to zero 
because we assume that milk and materials inputs cannot be substituted in butter production.   
is the ratio of the percentage change in the quantity of the first good to the percentage change in 
the quantity of the second good, which in the case of goods-complements, produced in fixed 
proportions, equals unity. 1/ PCa  ,   11 //)( PPCb   , and their difference is equal 
unity
9
. 
 
The price transmission elasticity for the second jointly-produced product ( 2E ) is derived by the 
analogy with the price transmission elasticity for the first product ( 1E ). It appears that price 
transmission from agricultural input to the first output is not same as that to the second output: 
021  EE  (see equation A.10.25 in Appendix 10). Thus, 
1
2
2
1


E
E . As the fixed coefficient 
                                                 
9
 This is because 
21 PCP    and b is equal to 
1
2
P
P
b

 . 
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 10 in our case, and in all other cases, when goods are produced in fixed proportions, equals 
one, the ratio of price transmission elasticities of the first and the second jointly-produced goods 
is determined by the reversed ratio of demands for those goods. Only in the case when demands 
for both jointly-produced goods are identical, i.e., 21   , their price transmission elasticities are 
the same.  
 
Let us now investigate the main determinants of price transmission for jointly-produced goods 
using the equation of 1E  (56). The effects of market power and returns to scale lead to 
significant changes in price transmission. Thus, to receive the price transmission for the industry 
characterised by constant returns to scale, operating in the competitive market, we set 0 , 
0 , 1  and 0 11. Knowing that 1  and 1ba , price transmission elasticity for the 
first output under perfect competition and constant returns to scale ( cE1 ) reduces to 
 
  
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21
142
21
2
2
1 
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
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(57) 
 
With the elasticity of supply of material input ( ) equal to zero, price transmission elasticity will 
be )21212/(221   SaE c . If in perfect competition and constant returns to scale  
121  , price transmission elasticity is 1/2 of the share of the agricultural input in the 
industry‟s cost function (
21
SaE c ). In the case of 221  , price transmission elasticity in 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale is 1/3 of the share of the agricultural input in the 
industry‟s cost function (Sa). This means that even in perfect competition the value of price 
transmission elasticity is not fixed; it depends on parameter values such as returns to scale, 
elasticity of substitution between inputs, elasticity of supply of material input and retail 
elasticities of demand. The higher the elasticities of demand, the lower the price transmission 
elasticity. Price transmission elasticity equals the share of agricultural input if elasticites of 
demand are highly inelastic ( 01.021  ). 
 
                                                 
10
 δ is the ratio of percentage change in the output of one good over the percentage change in the output of the other 
good. 
11
   is the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs, which equals to zero because we 
assume that milk and material inputs cannot be substituted in the butter production.  
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Under the same conditions but with market power, pass-through coefficient and returns to scale 
effects price transmission elasticity for the first output ( 1E ) equals 
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(58) 
 
Comparing the price transmission elasticity in perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
( cE1 ) with the price transmission elasticity in imperfect competition and non-constant returns to 
scale ( 1E ) we highlight the impacts of market power, pass-through coefficient and returns to 
scale. Thus, dividing cE1  over 1E , we have 
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To see the role of market structure more transparently, we assume 0 . Then, equation (59) 
reduces to 
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If the industry is characterised by the constant returns to scale, 1 , then equation (60) reduces 
to  
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To see the pure impact of market structure, we set the elasticities of retail demands equal to two 
( 221  ) to receive 
.1
1
1  
E
E c  
(62) 
 
Equation (62) implies that with the monopoly power indicator (  ) greater than zero and/or the 
pass-through coefficient ( ) greater than zero, the ratio of price transmissions in competitive and 
uncompetitive environments is higher than unity ( 1/ 11 EE c ). In other words, price 
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transmission in a competitive environment ( cE1 ) will be higher than in an uncompetitive 
environment ( 1E ), and the over-shift will be equal to )(  . Thus,   and   determine the 
extent of the deviation of price transmission elasticity from the competitive benchmark. The 
higher the elasticity of monopoly mark-up  , as well as the pass-through coefficient  , the 
lower the transmission indicator in imperfect competition and the bigger the difference between 
the price transmission elasticities in perfect and imperfect competition. Assuming the perfectly 
competitive industry, we are able to emphasise the impact of returns to scale on price 
transmission elasticity. With 0  and 0  equation (60) will be reduced to 
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(63) 
 
which implies that if 1 , then 11/1 EcE ; however if 1 , then 11/1 EcE . This means that 
price transmission with increasing returns to scale is higher than that with constant returns to 
scale (if both conditionally are estimated under perfect competition). With 1 , price 
transmission with constant returns to scale will over-shift that with decreasing returns to scale 
( 1/ 11 EE c ). This makes it obvious that the returns to scale parameter might change the 
incidence of transmission elasticity. The role of returns to scale can either impede or reinforce 
the role of the market power in the industry. 
The impact of returns to scale on price transmission elasticity can be confirmed by 
partially differentiating equation (58) by  : 
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(64) 
 
Equation (64) is greater than zero, as Sa can not be bigger than one. Therefore we conclude that 
the increase in the returns to scale parameter   leads to the increase in the price transmission 
elasticity.  
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The impact of oligopoly power on price transmission can be detected by partially differentiating 
the equation (58) by J, where nJ /  is an adjusted Lerner index12 which is responsible for the 
degree of market power in the industry. As the partial derivative is less than zero, the increase in 
the degree of market power leads to the decrease in price transmission elasticity: 
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(65) 
 
 
4.3. Interpretation of results and sensitivity analysis 
 
One of the main results achieved in this study is that price transmission for a jointly-produced 
output is different from that for a single output. This result is thoroughly discussed in the next 
section, “Price transmission for a single vs. jointly-produced output”. Then, we fulfil a sensitivity 
analysis for determinants of price transmission elasticity of a jointly-produced good. Problems 
are addressed more precisely in the case studies in the last part of this chapter. 
 
4.3.1. Price transmission for a single vs. jointly-produced output 
 
When estimating price transmission elasticity for a joint output good, using the conception of a 
single output ( ), we must confirm whether we estimate 1E  or 2E , or we estimate both in the 
case of 21  
13
. Thus, four possible cases may occur: 
1. 21 EE  , 
2. 1E  but 2E , 
3. 2E  but 1E , 
4. 21 EE  . 
To check this numerically, - we attach the same values to the parameters for  , 1E  and 2E  
estimation. We set the number of firms for  , 1E  and 2E  estimation ,100n elasticity of 
substitution between agricultural and material inputs ,5.0 returns to scale elasticity of 
supply ,1  of material inputs ,5.0 agriculturla share in total inputs used 
                                                 
12
 The Lerner index for the first product, adjusted by the corresponding demand elasticity, is equal to 
nL /11   , and for the second product is equal to nL /22   . We take nJ /  because 1  and 2  
are negative.  
13
 If 21   , then 21 EE  . If 21   , then 21 EE  . This is because 1221 / EE   and 1 . For details see 
equation A.10.26 in Appendix A.10. 
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,5.0
A
S conjectural variations parameter ,05.0 elasticity of demand for an output 
4.0 14. Additional parameters for 1E  and 2E  estimation are the coefficient indicating fixed 
production proportions ,1  the share of one firm‟s first output in the throughput of this firm 
,3.0
1
k and the share of one firm‟s second output in the throughput of this firm 7.0
2
k . 
Elasticity of demand of the second joint product 2  is calibrated until we reach the conditions 
1E  or 2E  (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 Calibration of 2  to reach the conditions 1E  or 2E  
 
Varied parameter   1E  2E  
(1) (2) (3) 
4.02   0.510 0.352 0.352 
36.02   0.510 0.371 0.413 
315.02   0.510 0.405 0.514 
245.02   0.510 0.509 0.832 
23.02   0.510 0.551 0.959 
 Note: 4.0,4.0,05.0,5.0,5.0,1,5.0,100 1  ASn , 7.0,3.0,1 21  kk  
 
First line of Table 7 indicates that 21 EE  , which means that price transmission of a single 
output is different from price transmission elasticities of jointly-produced goods. Thus, the first 
condition above, 21 EE  , is not valid. Instead of that, the fourth condition, 21 EE  , takes 
place in major cases of this table. The second condition, 1E  but 2E , is fulfilled 
when 245.02  , and the third condition, 2E  but 1E , is fulfilled when 315.02  .  
 
From this analysis, becomes clear that   never equals to 21 EE  , and it equals to 1E  or to 2E  
only in some special cases. Therefore it is correct to consider the properties of joint production 
when estimating price transmission.  
 
According to McCorriston et al. (1989: 191), the “perfect” price transmission occurs when the 
price transmission elasticity equals to the share of the agricultural product, used in the food 
industry‟s cost function. In other words, the “perfect” price transmission is defined as 
the Saontransmissipriceperfect  , where 10 Sa . For this condition to occur, the elasticity of 
supply of material input should be equal to zero, and the condition of perfect competition must 
                                                 
14
 Demand elasticities for joint production are assumed to be equal to 0.4 in order to be compared to the results of 
the study by McCorriston et al. (2001). However, we admit that elasticity of demand may be only greater than one in 
the monopoly outcome.  
52 
 
be fulfilled. McCorriston et al. (2001) shows that if perfect competition and the elasticity of 
supply of material input equals to zero, price transmission depends on the share of agriculture, 
returns to scale and the elasticity of demand of an output  (equation 66): 
 
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1
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

Sa
c  
(66) 
In this case, if constant returns to scale occur, we have: 
.Sa
c
  (67) 
 
If we set the same parameter values for the key determinants such as 1,0,0   to estimate 
the price transmission elasticity of a joint output, - we will receive the following equation (68): 
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Thus, we may say that price transmission elasticity of a joint product in a case of perfect 
competition, constant returns to scale and elasticity of supply of material input equal to zero 
depends on 1,2,1, kSa  . Number of firms n tends to eternity in perfect competition, conjectural 
variations parameter KV and a coefficient - , determining that the outputs relationship are 
externally given and fixed.  
 
In other words, price transmission of a jointly-produced good in a case of perfect competition, 
constant returns to scale and elasticity of supply of material input equal to zero depends not only 
on the share of agriculture, as in the case of a single output, but also on the elasticities of demand 
of both jointly-produced goods and a coefficient determining the share of the first joint output in 
a gross output. 
 
The calibration of the values of 1,2,1 k  may give us a condition when SaE 1 . Thus, giving 
the values to the variables 4.02,83.01   , and a parameter 3.01k , we receive SaE 1 . 
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These results lead us to the conclusion that the conception of price transmission for a single 
output, developed by the whole range of studies working with the EDM approach, is not valid 
for the case of joint outputs. 
 
4.3.2. Price transmission for a single vs. aggregated joint outputs 
 
According to Schroeter and Azzam (1991) the "single" output could represent a set of multiple 
outputs produced in fixed proportions. However, our study results show that price transmission 
for a "single" output can not represent the aggregated price transmission of a set of multiple 
outputs produced in fixed proportions. Thus, price transmission of a "single" output is equal to 
0.5,
 
whereas the aggregated price transmission of a set of joint outputs in a ceteris paribus case is 
equal to 0.3. If price transmission of a first output good is 0.3, and of a second jointly-produced 
output is 0.3, then the price transmission of a joint good is also 0.3.
 15
  
 
It might be checked by introducing the prices for the outputs, such as e.g.  2$ and 5$ for both 
jointly-produced goods respectively. 30% out of price 2$ gives the value of 0.6$, and out of price 
5$ gives the value of 1.5%. Aggregating these values gives 2,1$ (0.6$+1.5$). The aggregated 
transmitted value 2.1$ is 30% of the aggregated price 7$ (2$+5$). Thus, in a case when joint 
products price transmisions are equal each to 0.3, the aggregated price transmission for multiple 
outputs produced in fixed proportions is equal to 0.3. Price transmission of a single output under 
the same possible conditions is equal to 0.5. 
 
This leads us to a conclusion, that price transmission of a "single" good can not represent 
aggregated price transmission of multiple outputs produced in fixed proportions. 
 
4.3.3. Determinants of price transmission elasticity of a jointly-produced good 
 
In this section we conduct the sensitivity analysis for the case of price transmission in joint 
production with respect to two groups of model parameters: external parameters that describe the 
underlying market organisation, and internal parameters that describe the underlying production 
technology.  
 
In these two groups of parameters, the two elements that are of particular interest namely are the 
type of market structure and returns to scale. In this section we discuss how different market 
                                                 
15
 See table 7, first line. 
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structures and returns to scale affect price transmissions of jointly-produced goods. We will test 
whether these parameters have an identical or different impact on both joint goods. We will 
discuss the sensitivity of the direction of price transmission change with respect to all 
parameters. The magnitude of change will be examined with regard to some parameters only. 
 
In particular, we will discuss three scenarios: change in the market structure alone, change in 
returns to scale alone and a combination of these two scenarios. 
 
a. Sensitivity with respect to the market organisation parameters 
 
Market organization forms the way, in which exchange in a market takes place. It is determined 
by a combination of factors, including: 
 
1.a. market power parameter (  ), which determines the ability of a producer to set the price, 
and conjectural variation ( ), which has an impact on market power parameter; 
2.a. elasticity of supply of materials input;  
3.a. and elasticities of demand of jointly-produced goods. 
 
 
1.a. Market power 
 
We start by testing several market structure scenarios by considering different degrees of market 
power in the industry with alternative returns to scale. We seek to determine how the variation in 
market power affects price transmission for two jointly-produced goods under different returns 
to scale. We also aim to check whether this impact is identical for two price transmission 
elasticities. 
 
We consider several scenarios for the market power parameter (  ) under constant returns to 
scale (Table 8) and under increasing returns to scale (Table 9). 0  corresponds to the perfect 
competition in the industry and 145.0  to the monopoly, with values ranging between these 
values, such as 006.0  to 033.0  corresponding to different degrees of imperfect 
competition, with higher values corresponding to higher degrees of imperfect competition.  
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Table 8 Sensitivity of price transmission for two jointly-produced goods with respect to 
market power under constant returns to scale 
 
Scenarios for 
market power  
First jointly-produced good 
 
Second jointly-produced good 
Price 
transmission  
(E1) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
Price 
transmission 
(E2) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  0  0.3304 - 0.4956 - 
2.  006.0  0.3292 0.3631 0.4938 0.3631 
3.  012.0  0.3282 0.3037 0.4923 0.3037 
4.  019.0  0.3270 0.3656 0.4905 0.3656 
5.  027.0  0.3256 0.4281 0.4884 0.4281 
6.  033.0  0.3244 0.3685 0.4866 0.3685 
7.  1454.0  0.3056 - 0.4584 - 
Note: 0  corresponds to the case of perfect competition (number of firms tend to infinity), 006.0  corresponds 
to the case of 20 firms in the industry, 012.0  corresponds to the case of 11 firms in the industry, 019.0  
corresponds to the case of 7 firms in the industry, 027.0  corresponds to the case of 5 firms in the industry, 
033.0  corresponds to the case of 4 firms in the industry, and 1454.0  corresponds to the case of monopoly. 
1 , 5.0Sa , 6.01 , 4.02 , 05.0 , 3.01 ik , 7.02 ik , 1 , 5.0  and 0 .  
 
Table 8 and Figure 3 below present results of the sensitivity analysis for the key price 
transmission determinant of the model: market power indicator. We find that under different 
degrees of market power, price transmissions for two jointly-produced goods are different in 
absolute terms, whereas their changes in relative terms are identical (compare columns 2 and 4 
of Table 8).  
 
The economic interpretation is the following: oligopolistic processor takes two jointly-produced 
goods as a single global output. The total gross return the oligopolist receives is made by the sum 
of the partial returns from the two jointly-produced goods. It is naturally in the interest of the 
oligopolist that the total gross return is as high as possible. However, for this total gross return to 
be the highest possible, it is necessary for the individual partial returns that make it up also to be 
as high as possible. Thus, the increased degree of market power is transferred to both jointly-
produced goods at a maximum. If market demands differ in the two markets, price transmission 
absolute values are different. However, relative changes in price transmissions are identical, 
being a maximum transfer of the increased degree of market power of an oligopolistic processor.  
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Table 9 and Figure 4 show the sensitivity of price transmission with respect to the market power 
indicator under increasing returns to scale. It appears that under increasing returns to scale, price 
transmissions of two jointly-produced goods are higher than those under constant returns to scale 
(compare Tables 8 and 9). Moreover, the same changes in the market power under the increasing 
returns to scale lead to the greater changes in the price transmission estimates. For example, the 
change in the E1 from the first to the second scenario under the constant returns to scale is 0.36 
per cent (Table 8, column 2), but under the increasing returns to scale it is 0.52 per cent (Table 9, 
column 2). Thus, the more effective industry functioning reduces the impact of market power, 
but increases the changes in this impact. 
 
The sensitivity of price transmission according to the pure returns to scale scenario is considered 
in Section 3.4.2 in the context of production technology. 
 
Table 9 Sensitivity of price transmission for two jointly-produced goods with respect to 
market power under increasing returns to scale 
 
Scenarios for 
market power  
First jointly-produced good 
 
Second jointly-produced good 
Price 
transmission  
(E1) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
Price 
transmission 
(E2) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  0  0.4934 - 0.7401 - 
2.  006.0  0.4908 0.5269 0.7362 0.5269 
3.  012.0  0.4886 0.4482 0.7330 0.4346 
4.  019.0  0.4859 0.5525 0.7289 0.5593 
5.  027.0  0.4829 0.6174 0.7244 0.6173 
6.  033.0  0.4803 0.5384 0.7204 0.5521 
7.  1454.0  0.4401 - 0.6602 - 
Note: 5.0 . See in the notes for Table 9 the values of other parameters for price transmission estimations. 
 
 
Under decreasing returns to scale (Table 10 and Figure 3 below) the effect of market power is 
damped but less pronounced (volatile) than this effect in the cases of constant (Table 8) and 
increasing (Table 9) returns to scale.  
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Table 10 Sensitivity of price transmission for two jointly-produced goods with respect to 
market power under decreasing returns to scale 
 
Scenarios for 
market power  
First jointly-produced good 
 
Second jointly-produced good 
Price 
transmission  
(E1) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
Price 
transmission 
(E2) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  0  0.1659 - 0.2488 - 
2.  006.0  0.1656 0.1808 0.2484 0.1607 
3.  012.0  0.1653 0.1811 0.2480 0.1610 
4.  019.0  0.1650 0.1814 0.2476 0.1612 
5.  027.0  0.1647 0.1818 0.2470 0.2019 
6.  033.0  0.1644 0.1821 0.2466 0.2023 
7.  1454.0  0.1594 - 0.2391 - 
Note: 5.1 . See in the notes for Table 9 the values of other parameters for price transmission estimations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The impact of market power on the dynamics of price transmission in different 
types of economies of scale 
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2.a. Elasticity of supply of material input 
 
Price elasticity of supply measures the sensitivity of the quantity of a good supplied to the 
changes in the market price for that good. Thus, the price elasticity of input supply affects the 
quantity of input used in production and hence the quantity of output produced, which in turn has 
a direct impact on price transmission elasticity.  
 
In our model, we have two price elasticities of factor supply: price elasticity of agricultural input 
supply and price elasticity of material input supply.
16
  
 
Following, we discuss the impact of the elasticity of material input supply on price transmission. 
We discuss it, first, for the case when inputs are pure complements
17
 ( 0 ) and, second, for the 
case when they are not complements ( 0 ). The first case corresponds perfectly to our 
reference example of butter production when milk cannot be substituted with dairy separator 
equipment. The impact of the elasticity of supply of material input on price transmission (E1 and 
E2) when agricultural and material inputs are perfect complements ( 0 ) appears to be 
unambiguous (equation 69). We find that an increase in the elasticity of supply of materials input 
leads to the decline in price transmission elasticities for both jointly-produced goods. 
18
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(69)
  
where 
1122212221122122  baaSaabaab  .  
 
The economic reason for this result can be illustrated with a reference to a certain shock from the 
agricultural supply side, e.g. the decrease in the supply of agricultural inputs (Figure 4a). The 
agricultural input supply shift decreases the derived supply for the retail product such that the 
price for the retail product increases (Figure 4c). So long as the agricultural and material inputs 
are complements, the decrease in the agricultural input will lead to the corresponding decrease in 
material input usage (Figure 4b). Thus, the demand function for material input in this case is 
fixed and therefore absolutely inelastic. Figure 4c shows the corresponding changes on the retail 
                                                 
16
 Since we estimate price transmission elasticity from agricultural input to output, price elasticity of agricultural 
input supply has no impact on price transmission elasticity 
17
 This is measured by the elasticity of substitution between factor inputs (). 
18
 Note that Sa<1 
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market. Retail supply shifts to the left as a result of the change in the agricultural and material 
inputs. However, the slope of the retail supply depends on the slope of the supply of material 
input. The higher the elasticity of material input supply, the higher the elasticity of the retail 
supply. As shown in Figure 4c, the market power mark-up is higher under the more elastic 
supply of the retail product, thus the price transmission elasticity in this case is lower, which is 
also indicated in equation (69).  
a. Equilibrium on the
agricultural input market
b.  Equilibrium on the
materials input market
A2  A1
P1
P2
Agricultural
quantity
Agricultural
price
Materials
Price
Materials
quantity
M2  M1
D S
S‘
DD‘
S elastic
S less elastic
 
Mark-up under
elastic supply
Mark-up under
inelastic supply
DemandMR
c. Equilibrium on the retail market
Shift in inelastic supply
Shift in elastic supply
 
 
Figure 4 Price movements for inputs-complements (case of 0 )  
 
Price of a joint 
output 
Quantity of a 
joint output 
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The case of butter production normally shows no substitutability between agricultural and 
material inputs. Thus, a certain amount of milk might be used with a combination of a certain 
number of pieces of creaming equipment for a production of a certain amount of butter and skim 
milk powder. However, in this example, a negligible degree of substitutability might occur if we 
were to assume a special type of separation equipment able to absorb more fat from the same 
amount of milk. In this case, elasticity of substitution between inputs will be very small, but 
different from zero ( 0 ). To check for this case, we again fulfil the differentiation of E1 by   
while holding 0  (equation 70). 
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where   stays for a fraction
19
.                                                                                                    (70) 
Equation (70) acquires a negative sign only in the case when the second component enclosed in 
the squared brackets in the numerator is negative and gives an absolute value bigger than the 
sum of the first and the third squared brackets in the numerator. This component will be negative 
only in the case when 1 . Thus, when the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, increase 
in the elasticity of supply of material input will lead to the decrease in price transmission. 
However, when the elasticity of substitution is equal or bigger than unity, the increase in the 
elasticity of supply of material input will lead to the increase in price transmission. We 
implicated these results in the numerical sensitivity analysis in Table 11. 
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Table 11 Changes in price transmission elasticity for the first good under different 
elasticities of supply of material input ( ) and elasticities of substitution between inputs 
)(  
 
  
 
  
0  1.0  1  2  
2.0  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.1  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change  
in  E1 
0.3595 0.2511 0.3634 0.2709 0.3953 0.3995 0.4256 0.4836 
Note: The results are derived under 069.0  which corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 1 , 5.0Sa , 
6.01 , 4.02 , 05.0 , 3.01 ik , 7.02 ik , and 1 .  
 
Whenever  , the price transmission elasticity does not react to any changes in the elasticity 
of supply of material input. Such a high degree of elasticity of substitution implies that one input 
can be perfectly substituted by another input. Thus, when agricultural input is perfectly 
substitutable with material input, the changes in the elasticity of supply of material input have no 
impact on the price transmission elasticity.  
 
We did not present results from the sensitivity analysis for the second price transmission 
elasticity E2 because E1 is a linear homogenous function of E2. Therefore the overall impact of 
parameters on E1 is identical to that on E2. Thus, the increase of E2 by a certain degree will lead 
to E1 being increased by the same degree. For example, an increase in the material input supply 
elasticity from 0.2 to 0.5 will lead to the decline in price transmission elasticity of the first good 
by 11.4603 per cent, and in the transmission elasticity to the second good by 11.4592 per cent 
(Table 12 and Figure 5 below), etc.  
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Table 12 Impact of price elasticity of supply of material inputs on price transmission 
elasticities of jointly-produced goods 
 
Scenarios for 
market power  
First jointly-produced good 
 
Second jointly-produced good 
Price 
transmission  
(E1) 
Decrease from 
the first scenario 
(%) 
Price 
transmission 
(E2) 
Decrease from 
the first scenario 
(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  2.0  0.3595 - 0.5393 - 
2.  5.0  0.3183 11.4603 0.4775 11.4592 
3.  1  0.2673 25.6467 0.4009 25.6628 
4.  5  0.1170 67.4547 0.1756 67.4392 
Note: for 069.0  with 2 firms in the industry, 1 , 5.0Sa , 6.01 , 4.02 , 05.0 , 3.01 ik , 
7.02 ik , 1 , 5.0  and 0 .  
 
 
Figure 5. Impact of price elasticity of supply of material inputs on price transmission 
elasticities of jointly-produced goods 
 
3.a. Elasticities of demand of jointly-produced goods 
 
Elasticity of demand shows the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good to a change 
in its price. Our model considers the responsiveness of two jointly-produced goods, supplied in 
fixed proportions, to two dependent on each other prices. 
 
Our results show that the elasticity of demand of one good affects not only its own price 
transmission, but also the price transmission of the other jointly-produced good.  
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Table 13a demonstrates the impact of the price elasticity of demand of the first output good on 
price transmission elasticity of this good depending on the values of parameters 2k  and 2 . 
From these results we see that with lower values of 2k price transmission increases when 1  
increases, and with higher values of 2k price transmission decreases when 1  increases; the 
increase in 2  leads to the decrease in price transmission. 
 
Table 13 The impact of the price elasticity of demand of the first jointly-produced product 
( 1 ) on price transmission elasticity of this product (E1) under the alternative values of 
parameter 2k  and 2  when: 
a. 3.02k  and 7.0
20
 
Share of the 
second output 
in the 
throughput        
 
7.01k  and 3.02k  
 
3.01k  and 7.02 k  
Elasticity  
of demand of 
the  
second output 
 
6.02  
 
6.12   
 
6.02   
 
6.12   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elasticity  
of demand of the  
first output 
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
Price 
transmission    
(E1 ) 
 
0.1793 
 
0.4344 
 
 
0.1221 
 
 
0.1290 
 
 
0.2570 
 
 
0.2507 
 
 
0.2226 
 
 
0.1891 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 2k  illustrates the share of the second jointly-produced good in the throughput. The bigger the share of the second 
good ( 2k ), the lower the share of the first jointly-produced good ( 1k ). For example, if the share of the first good is 
0.3 ( 3.01 k ), the share of the second good is 0.7 ( 7.02 k ); however, if the share of the first good in the 
throughput increases to 0.5 ( 5.01 k ), the share of the second good decreases to 0.5 ( 5.02k ).  
 
64 
 
b. 5.02k  and 6.0  
Share of the 
second output 
in the 
throughput        
 
5.01k  and 5.02 k  
 
4.01k  and 6.02k  
Elasticity  
of demand of 
the  
2
nd
  output 
 
6.02   
 
6.12   
 
6.02   
 
6.12   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elasticity  
of demand of the  
1
st
 output 
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
 
4.01  
 
8.01  
Price 
transmission    
(E1 ) 
 
0.2112 
 
0.3179 
 
0.1578 
 
0.1534 
 
0.2319 
 
0.2804 
 
 
0.1847 
 
 
0.1693 
 
Note: For 069.0 that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 1 , 5.0Sa , 05.0 , 1 , 5.0   and 
0 . 
 
Table 13b indicates that when the share of the second product is 0.5 and 0.6, with higher values 
for 2 , an increase in 1  leads to the decrease in price transmission; however, with lower values 
for 2 , an increase in 1  
leads to the increase in price transmission. An increase in 2  in all 
considered cases leads to the decrease in price transmission.  
 
In sum, when the share of the first product is high (0.7), an increase in the elasticity of demand 
for this product increases its price transmission. When the share of the first product is low (0.3), 
an increase in the elasticity of demand for this product leads to the decrease in its price 
transmission. When the share of the first good is equal or close to the share of the second jointly-
produced good (0.5; 0.6), the elasticity of demand of the first good increases price transmission 
if the elasticity of demand for a second good is low, and decreases price transmission if it is high.  
 
In the sensitivity analysis of the single output system, given in Chapter 3, the reaction of the 
price transmission elasticity   to the change in the elasticity of retail demand   is determined by 
the degree of returns to scale  . With lower degrees of returns to scale, price transmission 
decreases when elasticity of demand increases; however, under constant and increasing returns to 
scale, price transmission increases when elasticity of demand increases. Therefore, in the 
following we discuss whether returns to scale might have an impact on the price transmission 
elasticity in a joint products case as well.  
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Table 14 presents the results of the numerical analysis. Under decreasing and constant returns to 
scale price transmission of the first jointly-produced good decreases if the elasticity of demand 
for this good increases. However, under the increasing returns to scale, price transmission starts 
to increase when the elasticity of demand increases.  
 
Table 14 The impact of price elasticity of demand of the first output good on the respective 
price transmission under different returns to scale 
 
a. Share of the first jointly-produced good in the throughput is high 
 Returns to scale 
3.0  1  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price elasticity 
of demand of 
the first  
output good 
 
8.01  
 
8.11  
 
8.01  
 
8.11  
Price 
transmission of 
the first output 
good (E1) 
 
0.0859 
 
0.0661 
 
0.2507 
 
 
0.2363 
Note: for 069.0  with 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 6.02 , 05.0 , 7.01k , 3.02k , 1 , 5.0  
and 0 .  
 
b. Share of the first jointly-produced good in the throughput is low 
 Returns to scale 
1.1  
(1) (2) 
 
Price elasticity of 
demand of the first  
output good 
 
8.01  
 
8.11  
Price transmission of the 
first output good (E1) 
 
 
0.2759 
 
0.2930 
Note: For 069.0  that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 6.02 , 05.0 , 3.01k , 7.02k , 
1 , 5.0  and 0 .  
 
Next consider the cross impact of demand elasticities on price transmission elasticities of both 
jointly-produced goods. Table 16 illustrates this dependency numerically. When 21    ( 4.01  
and 6.02 ), price transmission of the first product (E1=0.2570) is higher than that of the 
second one (E2=0.1713). When 21   ( 6.01  and 4.02 ), price transmission of the first 
product (E1=0.3181) is lower than that of the second product (E2=0.4775).   
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Table 15 The cross impact of the demand elasticities on price transmissions of joint goods 
 
Elasticities of demands 
of first and second 
jointly-produced goods 
4.024.01    4.026.01    6.024.01    
 (1) (2) (3) 
E1 0.2952 0.3183 0.2570 
E2 0.2952 0.4775 0.1713 
Note: For 069.0 that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 05.0 , 3.01k , 7.02k , 
1 , 1 , 5.0 , and 0 . 
 
When price elasticities of demands on both markets are identical ( 4.021  ), price 
transmissions of both jointly-produced goods are also identical. Thus, when two markets are 
identical the oligopolist sees no reason to consider each of them separately.  
 
An increase in the elasticity of demand of the first output leads to the increase in price 
transmission elasticities of both joint outputs. An increase in the elasticity of demand of a second 
joint output leads to the decrease in price transmission of both joint outputs. This points to the 
fact that jointly-produced products are not independent bodies, but are in a fixed relationship to 
each other and are even treated as a single product. The producer treats jointly-produced goods 
as a single product, supplied to a single market, which, however, has two elasticities of demand. 
Thus, an increase in one elasticity of demand leads to an increase in price transmission, whereas 
an increase in the other elasticity of demand leads to a decrease in price transmission.  
 
Price transmission is higher on the market of the particular jointly-produced good, which 
elasticity of demand is lower than another good‟s. For example, consumers of butter will benefit 
more from the milk price decline than consumers of skim milk powder, if demand for butter is 
less elastic than for skim milk powder, and the other way round.  
 
b. Sensitivity with respect to the production technology 
 
Another important set of parameters determining the price transmission elasticities for jointly-
produced goods describes the production technology of these goods. We divide these parameters 
into three groups: 
 
1.b. parameters representing  inputs combination, i.e., the share of agricultural input ( Sa ),  
and the elasticity of inputs substitution ( ); 
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2.b. parameters representing the throughput separation, i.e., the shares of jointly-produced 
products in the throughput ( 2,1 kk ), and the fixed production coefficient ( ); 
3.b. and the parameter representing the efficiency of the processing technology, namely the 
returns to scale parameter (  ). 
 
 
1.b. Parameters describing inputs combination 
 
The elasticity of substitution is a measure of the ease with which the varying factor can be 
substituted by others (Hicks, 1932). 
 
According to equation (71), an increase in   will increase E1. Thus, the higher degree of inputs 
substitutability leads to the increase in price transmission elasticity.  
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where Z stays for a fraction.
 21
 (71)  
 
Table 16 and Figure 6 below indicate that the increase in the elasticity of substitution between 
inputs increases price transmission elasticities of jointly-produced goods.   
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Table 16 The impact of elasticity of substitution on price transmission elasticities of jointly-
produced goods 
Elasticity of substitution 
between inputs 
Price transmission of the first  
jointly-produced good (E1) 
Price transmission of the 
second  
jointly-produced good (E2) 
(1) (2) 
0  0.3183 0.4775 
1.0  0.3276 0.4914 
2.0  0.3365 0.5048 
3.0  0.3451 0.5177 
4.0  0.3534 0.5421 
5.0  0.3614 0.5536 
6.0  0.3690 0.5558 
7.0  0.3764 0.5647 
8.0  0.3836 0.5754 
9.0  0.3905 0.5858 
1  0.3972 0.5958 
Note: For 069.0  that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 05.0 , 6.01 , 4.02 , 3.01k , 
7.02k , 1 , 1  and 5.0 . 
 
 
Figure 6. The impact of elasticity of substitution on price transmission elasticities of jointly-
produced goods 
 
The next parameter that might determine the extent of price transmission elasticity is the share of 
agricultural input ( Sa ). In our case, butter production, the shares of agricultural and materials 
input are fixed because of the nature of the product. Hence, the sensitivity analysis with respect 
to Sa is not necessary for our study. However, as these inputs might be slightly substitutable in 
reality, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter as well.    
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As price transmission determines how price changes of the agricultural input feeds through the 
output, the bigger the share of agricultural input, the higher the price transmission from this input 
to the output (Gardner, 1975). Thus, the increase in the share of agricultural input should 
increase the price transmissions of both outputs. Table 17 and Figure 7 present the results.    
 
Table 17 The impact of the increased share of agricultural input on price transmission 
elasticities of jointly-produced goods 
 
 Price transmission of the first 
jointly-produced  
good (E1) 
Price transmission of the 
second jointly-produced 
good (E2) 
(1) (2) 
Sa = 0 0 0 
Sa = 0.1 0.0552 0.0828 
Sa = 0.2 0.1142 0.1713 
Sa = 0.3 0.1774 0.2661 
Sa = 0.4 0.2453 0.3679 
Sa = 0.5 0.3383 0.4775 
Sa = 0.6 0.3972 0.5958 
Sa = 0.7 0.4825 0.7238 
Sa = 0.8 0.5753 0.8629 
Sa = 0.9 0.6764 1.0146 
Sa = 1 0.7870 1.1805 
Note: For 069.0  that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 05.0 , 6.01 , 4.02 , 3.01k , 7.02k , 
1 , 1 , 5.0  and 0 . 
 
 
Figure 7. The impact of the increased share of agricultural input on price transmission 
elasticities of jointly-produced goods 
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When agricultural input share in production function equals one, change in material input supply 
no longer has an impact on price transmission. This is because in cases, in which Sa = 1, material 
input is not involved in the production process (Table 18).  
 
Table 18 The impact of the elasticity of supply of materials input on price transmission if 
Sa = 1 
 
 Elasticity of material input supply 
5.0  5.1  
(1) (2) 
Price transmission of the first 
jointly-produced good (E1) 
0.7870 0.7870 
Price transmission of the 
second jointly-produced 
good (E2) 
1.1805 1.1805 
Note: for 069.0  with 2 firms in the industry, 1Sa , 05.0 , 6.01 , 4.02 , 3.01k , 7.02k , 
1 , 1   and 0 . 
 
2.b. Parameters representing the throughput separation 
 
The model assumes a throughput, which is further separated into two jointly-produced goods. 
We accomplish the separation using technical coefficients that determine the share of each 
jointly-produced good in a throughput. The coefficient 1k  determines the share of the first 
jointly-produced output, and coefficient 2k  determines the share of the second jointly- produced 
output. The bigger 1k  is, the more of the first good is produced; as a consequence of that the less 
of the second good is produced and the smaller the 2k  coefficient is. 
 
We assume that these shares cannot vary substantially because of the nature of the product that 
we select as a case study; therefore in the frames of our study we do not need to conduct the 
sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters.  
 
However, for a general case we conduct the sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters 
as well. The differentiation of the price transmission equations E1 and E2 with respect to the 
output shares produce cumbersome and unhandy results. Thus, we chose to show the results 
numerically.  
 
71 
 
Analysis shows that the impact of the output shares depends on the price elasticities of demand 
of jointly-produced goods. When these elasticities are identical, e.g. 4.021   (Table 19), the 
change in the shares of products supplied to these two markets has no effect on the price 
transmission elasticities.  
 
Table 19 The impact of the shares of jointly-produced goods on price transmission 
elasticities when 4.0
21
  
 
 Shares of the jointly-produced goods in the throughput 
quantity 
9.021.01  kk  7.023.01  kk  
(1) (2) 
Price transmission of the first 
jointly-produced good (E1) 
 
0.2952 
 
0.2952 
Price transmission of the 
second jointly-produced 
good (E2) 
 
0.2952 
 
0.2952 
Note: for 069.0  with 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 05.0  , 5.0 , 1 , 1   and 0 . 
 
However, when price elasticities of demand of two jointly-produced goods differ (see Tables 20a 
and 20b), then the change in the shares of these jointly-produced goods has an impact on price 
transmission elasticities. If the elasticity of demand for one good is higher than that for its 
jointly-produced good, then the increase in the production share of this good will increase its 
price transmission elasticity. However, when the elasticity of demand of one good is lower than 
that of its jointly-produced good, - then the increase in the production share of this good will 
decrease its price transmission elasticity. 
 
The economic intuition is the following: in a more competitive market, an increased number of 
goods supplied to the market will increase price transmission of these goods. However, in a less 
competitive market, an increased number of goods supplied to the market will decrease price 
transmission of these goods. 
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Table 20 The impact of the shares of jointly-produced goods on price transmission 
elasticities when 21    
a. Price transmission of the first jointly-produced good (E1) 
 Price elasticities of demand 
4.126.11    6.124.11    
9.021.01  kk  7.023.01  kk  9.021.01  kk  7.023.01  kk  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price 
transmission of 
the first jointly-
produced good 
(E1) 
0.1426 0.1502 0.1619 0.1542 
 
b. Price transmission of the second-jointly produced good (E2) 
 Price elasticities of demand 
6.124.11    4.126.11    
7.023.01  kk  9.021.01  kk  7.023.01  kk  9.021.01  kk  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price 
transmission of 
the second 
jointly-produced 
good (E2) 
0.1349 0.1716 0.1716 0.1416 
Note: for 069.0  with 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 05.0  , 5.0 , 1 , 1   and 0 . 
 
Another coefficient that describes the output markets regulates the relationship between two 
jointly-produced goods (δ). It is the ratio of percentage change in the output of one good over the 
percentage change in the output of the other good (equation 72). In the case of butter and skim 
milk powder production, or in any other case of goods-complements, - this coefficient equals 
unity. For instance, an increase in butter production by 10 per cent leads to an increase in skim 
milk powder production by 10 per cent as well. Thus, we call this measure a fixed production 
coefficient:  
 
.
2
ln
1
ln QdQd   (72) 
 
As we assume that the fixed production coefficient does not change in our model, we do not 
conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.  
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3.b. Returns to scale parameter 
 
The concept of returns to scale (  ) refers to changes in output subsequent to a proportional 
change in all inputs. If output increases by the same proportion as inputs, then there are constant 
returns to scale in place. If output increases by less than that proportional change, then we deal 
with decreasing returns to scale. If output increases more than this proportional change, there are 
increasing returns to scale.  
 
In our model there are two jointly-produced goods. Each output is sensitive to the returns to scale 
parameter. Equation (73) shows that as increase in the returns to scale leads to an unambiguous 
increase in the price transmission elasticity of a first jointly-produced good. As the first 
transmission elasticity is a linear homogenous function of the second one, this result is valid for a 
second good as well. 
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(73)  
where   is a fraction in denominator 22. Table 21  and Figure 7 present the numerical estimates 
of the price transmission elasticities of both jointly-produced goods under different degrees of 
returns to scale. While absolute values of price transmission of joint goods are different, their 
relative changes are identical. For example, when 5.0 , E1 = 0.1628 and E2 = 0.2442. When 
  increases to 1 , both elasticities increase by 95.5 per cent as compared to their previous 
values, respectively.  
 
Another interesting observation is that increasing   by 0.5 units in each scenario leads to the 
price transmission increase each time by a less percentage (compare columns 2 and 4 of Table 21 
under different scenarios). For instance, the change from decreasing to constant returns to scale 
has a higher impact on price transmission than does the changing from the constant to increasing 
returns to scale.  
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Table 21 The impact of returns to scale on price transmissions of jointly-produced goods 
 
Scenarios for 
returns to scale  
First jointly-produced good 
 
Second jointly-produced good 
Price 
transmission  
(E1) 
Deviation from 
the previous  
scenario (%) 
Price 
transmission 
(E2) 
Deviation from 
the previous 
scenario (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  01.0  0.0033 - 0.0049 - 
2.  5.0  0.1628 4833.3333 0.2442 4883.6734 
3.  1  0.3183 95.5159 0.4775 95.5364 
4.  5.1  0.4670 46.7169 0.7005 46.7015 
5.  2  0.6093 30.4710 0.9140 30.4782 
6.  5.2  0.7456 22.3699 1.1184 22.3632 
Note: For 069.0  that corresponds to 2 firms in the industry, 5.0Sa , 05.0 , 6.01 , 4.02 , 3.01k , 
7.02k , 5.0 , 1 ,  and 0 . 
 
 
Figure 8. The impact of returns to scale on price transmissions of jointly-produced goods 
 
 
Summarising research done in this chapter, we conclude that it contributes to the growing body 
of the price transmission theory on joint output price transmission. This chapter argues that the 
post-modern theory of price transmission and jointly-produced goods are not unrelated events: 
both reciprocally feed into each other‟s inherent interdependences.  
 
We follow the key studies on equilibrium displacement modelling by Gardner (1975) and 
McCorriston et al. (1989; 2001) in building the basic fundamentals of price transmission 
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relationships. While both studies use the same method to estimate price transmission, 
McCorriston undertakes it individually for a single output price transmission; in contrast, the 
present study offers a model that tackles price transmission for a joint output.  
 
This model examines price transmission in the case of two jointly-produced goods. The dairy 
industry, producing two goods-complements in production such as butter and skim milk powder, 
is chosen to illustrate this process. Butter and skim milk powder are produced with single costs 
and in fixed proportions to each other. These products are produced by the oligopolistic industry, 
which does not acquire oligopsony power.  
 
Model results show that price transmission of a jointly-produced output is different from that of a 
single output. Model results show that price transmission of a joint output is not equal to the 
share of agricultural input, as it is in the case of a single output (McCorriston et al., 1989). Thus, 
price transmission of a joint output in a case of perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
depends not only on the share of the agricultural input, as it is in the case of a single output, but 
additionally on the elasticities of demand of the jointly-produced goods and on a share of the 
joint output in a gross output. Therefore we conclude that the concept of price transmission of a 
single output, developed by the whole range of studies working with the EDM approach, is not 
valid for the case of joint outputs. Hence, it is vital to consider the properties of joint production 
when estimating price transmission of jointly-produced goods.  
 
Another result is that the price of input is differently transmitted to two jointly-produced goods 
depending on two independent retail demands of those goods. We show that the price 
transmission of a first jointly-produced product is governed by the price elasticity of demand not 
only of a first product, but also of a second product. Similarly, the price elasticity of demand of a 
first product governs not only price transmission of the product itself, but also price transmission 
of a second jointly-produced product.  
 
Model results show that the elasticities governing the price transmission of a single output as 
well as of joint outputs make the same impact. Table 22 indicates that increase in market power, 
returns to scale and the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs leads to 
the increase in the price transmission elasticity of a single good, as well as of jointly-produced 
goods. Increase in the elasticity of supply of the material input depends on the interaction of 
parameters  ,, . However, if the elasticity of supply of material input equals zero, increase or 
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decrease in the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and material inputs has no effect on 
joint products price transmission and on a single product price transmission elasticity.  
 
Elasticity of demand increases or decreases price transmission of a single product depending on 
the value of returns to scale parameter. Elasticity of demand of a first joint product increases or 
decreases price transmission of its output, depending on the values of such variables as returns to 
scale, elasticity of demand of a second jointly-produced product and the share of this product in a 
joint output.  
 
Thus, we may conclude that the sign of change of price transmission of a single product and of a 
joint product under the impact of certain elasticities is the same (Table 22).  
 
Table 22 Comparison of effects of different elasticities on price transmissions of single good 
vs. jointly-produced good 
 
 Price transmission of a single 
output 
Price transmission of a first joint 
output 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Market power 
increase 
  
Returns to scale 
increase 
  
Elasticity of supply 
of material input 
increase 
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of 
substitution between 
agricultural and 
material inputs 
increase 
 
 
 
 
Increase in the 
agricultural input 
share 
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of demand 
of a single output 
increase 
 
 
 
- 
Elasticity of demand 
of a first joint output 
increase 
 
- 
 
 
 
Note: the arrows indicate the sign of the direction of changes.  
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Finally, the results of the model show that when consumers of one of the jointly-produced goods 
gain from damping down the market power, consumers of the other good also gain. In addition 
we found that market power and returns to scale effects are transmitted in relative terms equally 
to both jointly-produced goods. This implies that consumers in both markets are affected in 
relative terms equally when changes in market power and returns to scale occur.  
 
Moreover, we also show that a subsequent increase in market power leads to a subsequent 
increase in price transmission, but a subsequent increase in returns to scale leads to a smaller 
increase in price transmission elasticity. Hence, the value of price transmission increase has its 
limit. 
 
We also found that the more effective industry functioning reduces the impact of market power 
but increases the changes in this impact. Thus, in the industry, characterised by increasing 
returns to scale market power is damped, but its impact is more pronounced. 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive understanding of price transmission in joint production in 
a theoretical context using an example of the dairy industry. However, this study is not limited to 
the dairy sector. It is a good contribution to the theory of price transmission for all kinds of 
jointly-produced goods. Cows producing milk and meat, sheep producing wool and meat and the 
crude oil sector generating motor gasoline and distillate are few examples of production 
processes that generate two outputs based on common costs.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
 
The central aims of this study are: to define and review the literature on the theoretical aspects of 
price transmission; to apply the method used to identify the theoretical properties of price 
transmission and to extend this method to the case of jointly-produced goods. Hence, the main 
contribution of this study is twofold covering the theory of price transmission and methodology 
used to identify theoretical aspects of price transmission, and the extension of the theory and 
methodology for the case of price transmission of jointly-produced goods. The focal points of 
these study address the following questions: 
(1) Theory and methodology: What is vertical price transmission and what kind of 
methodology may be used for a theoretical research on price transmission? 
(2) Extension of the theory and methodology: Is the price transmission of a jointly-
produced good identical to that of a single output? Specifically, the question is 
whether results achieved by McCorriston et al. (2001) are valid for the case of a 
jointly-produced good. 
 
Theory and methodology:  
 
First, a general definition of the term “vertical price transmission” is presented. This background 
information is then used to review and discuss the literature on theoretical aspects of price 
transmissions. Reviewed studies are classified according to their findings and the complexity of 
methodology used. This methodology is the equilibrium displacement modelling (EDM), and it 
is a major tool employed to conduct theoretical analyses of the mechanisms of price 
transmissions. Second, a detailed description of the EDM methodology is shown using the 
example of the McCorriston‟s et al. (2001) model. All steps of the modelling framework of this 
study are discussed, and a detailed description of the mathematical method is given.  
 
Results by McCorriston et al. (2001) are extraordinary and to some extent unexpected. They 
proved that price transmission might be complete even under imperfect competition. Thus, 
empirical findings (e.g., Griffith and Piggott (1994); Peltzman (2000); etc.) showing that market 
power does not necessarily mean imperfect price transmission, and perfect competition in the 
industry does not necessarily lead to a complete price transmission, now have a theoretical 
background. Another finding indicates that if the cost function is characterised by increasing 
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returns to scale, the influence of market power might be offset by the cost effects of scale 
enlargement, and the level of price transmission may increase relative to the competitive case. 
Apart from these major results the model by McCorriston et al. produces another finding, which 
may be successfully used for economic predictions, i.e., - the lower the elasticity of substitution 
between agricultural and material inputs, the smaller the price transmission elasticity for an 
agricultural output. Results of the model show that the impact of the elasticity of demand of 
material input, as well as of the elasticity of supply of material input on price transmission 
elasticity, is difficult to predict, as it depends on the interaction of several parameters 
simultaneously. In this chapter we also introduce suggestions for improvement of the results 
presented in the McCorriston et al. (2001) study. First, it is suggested to expand analysis of the 
determinants of price transmission, and second, typing errors should be corrected.  
 
Extension of the theory and methodology:  
 
This study argues that the emergence of a post-modern theory of price transmission and jointly-
produced goods are not unrelated events: both reciprocally feed into each other‟s inherent 
interdependences. Thus, the theory of price transmission is applied to a multiple output 
hypothesis, and the EDM model is extended to a case of two jointly-produced goods-
complements in production. We follow the key studies on equilibrium displacement modelling 
by Gardner (1975) and McCorriston et al. (1989; 2001) in building the basic fundamentals of 
price transmission relationships. The EDM model developed by these studies has been extended 
for price transmission from input to two jointly-produced outputs. The dairy industry, producing 
two goods-complements in production such as butter and skim milk powder, was chosen as an 
example, representing the multiple output hypothesis. Butter and skim milk powder are produced 
with single costs and in fixed proportion to each other. These products are produced by the 
oligopolistic industry, which does not acquire oligopsony power.  
 
Model results show that it is necessary to consider the properties of joint production when 
estimating price transmission of jointly-produced goods, because: 
1. Price transmission of a jointly-produced output is different from that of a single output. 
2. Price transmission of a joint output is not equal to the share of agricultural input, as it is 
in the case of a single output (McCorriston et al., 1989).  
3. Price transmission of a joint output in a case of perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale depends not only on the share of the agricultural input, as it is in the case of a 
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single output, but additionally on the elasticities of demand of the jointly-produced goods 
and on the share of the joint output in a gross output.  
4. Price of an input is differently transmitted to two jointly-produced goods depending on 
two independent retail demands of those goods.  
 
Model results show that it is necessary to consider the properties of joint production when 
estimating price transmission for multiple outputs. In dairy industry multiple outputs include 
goods-complements in production (butter and skim milk powder or cheese and whey) and 
substitutes in production (butter and cheese). In order to estimate price transmission for goods-
substitutes in production we first have to incorporate the impact of goods-compliments in 
production into the system. Our results show that the aggregated price transmission of goods-
complements in production is not equal to price transmission of a single output, which means 
that the effect of goods-complements in production should be considered when estimating price 
transmission for goods-substitutes in production. 
 
There are additional important results, which characterise price transmission in joint production: 
1. Elasticities governing the price transmission of a single output as well as price 
transmission of joint outputs make the same impact.  
2. When consumers of one of the jointly-produced goods gain from damping down the 
market power, consumers of the other good also gain.  
3. Market power and returns to scale effects are transmitted in relative terms equally to both 
jointly-produced goods.  
4. A subsequent increase in market power leads to a subsequent increase in price 
transmission, but a subsequent increase in returns to scale leads to a smaller increase in 
price transmission elasticity.  
 
 
Outlook of the research 
 
We considered the case of joint production by the example of goods-complements in production. 
The obvious extension of the model could be to introduce goods-substitutes in production into 
the modelling framework.  
 
Some studies (Kinnukan and Forker, 1987; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; Aguiar and Santana, 
2002) estimate price transmission of dairy products by regressing farm-gate milk price on a 
single dairy product, without considering the impact of ist joint outputs. Our study results show 
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that the value of price transmission of one dairy product should include the impact of goods 
produced in fixed proportions with this dairy product. For example, the value of price 
transmission of butter should contain the impact of skim milk powder, which should be 
incorporated into the empirical model. Further research may include an empirical application of 
this theoretical result.  
 
Next, market structure might be extended for the oligopsony case. Another extension includes 
incorporating some other shock factors into the model, e.g., the exogenous shift in the demand 
for one of the jointly-produced goods. This should lead to further development of the conception 
of joint product pricing. In general, this study could serve as the backbone for further extensions 
and research directions in this field.  
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Appendix 1 
 The transformation procedure for the output  
with respect to the input relative change ( Afd ln ) 
 
As the output elasticity with respect to the agricultural input is 
Q
A
A
Q



 , we may also write it 
Q
A
fA  and then 
A
Q
fA  . Converting it into percentage changes gives:  
.lnlnlnln AdQddfd A    (A.1.1) 
 
Now we exogenously incorporate the returns to scale parameter   and the elasticity of 
substitution  into this equation. So we have:  
).lnlnln(ln AdQddfd A  


 
(A.1.2) 
 
Add and subtract the same fraction (

Qd ln
) in the brackets:  
),lnln
lnln
ln(ln 


dAd
QdQd
Qdfd A   
(A.1.3) 
 
multiply and divide by parameter  , and simplify to get:     
)lnln
lnln
ln(ln 








dAd
QdQd
Qdfd A   
(A.1.4) 
)lnln
ln
(ln
)1(
ln 










dAd
Qd
Qdfd A 

  
(A.1.5) 
).lnlnln(ln
)1(
ln 




dAdQdQdfd A 

  
(A.1.6) 
 
From now on we will continue to transform only the second fraction of the equation above:  
)lnlnln( 


dAdQd   
     (A.1.7) 
 
As   , and MdAdQd lnlnln   ,  we have:  
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),lnlnlnlnlnln( 


ddAdAdMdAd   
(A.1.8) 
 
which yields: 
).ln)lnlnln(( 


ddAdMd   
(A.1.9) 
 
If we assume that  
,lnln  dd   (A.1.10) 
then  
)ln)lnlnln(( 


ddAdMd   
(A.1.11) 
and 
).lnlnlnln( 


ddAdMd   
(A.1.12) 
 
Displaying   as it is offered in Chiang (1967b):  


lnlnlnln
lnln
lnln
lnln
ddMdAd
MdAd
fdfd
MdAd
AM 




  
(A.1.13) 
 
and putting it into the fraction above will give:  
),lnlnlnln(
lnlnlnln
lnln



ddMdAd
ddMdAd
MdAd



  
(A.1.14) 
which is equal to:  
)lnln( MdAd 


 
(A.1.15) 
 
So, Afd ln  is transformed into the following form: 
 
)lnln(ln
)1(
ln MdAdQdfd A 






 
(A.1.16) 
 
Following are, first, the  derivation, and, second, the proof for  lnln dd  .  
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The proof for (A1.10):  lnln dd  :   
 lnln dd   only if   is a parameter, and 0ln d . As   , then  ddd  . 
Dividing both parts by   gives 





 ddd
 . Multiplying and dividing 

d
 by  , and 

d
 
by   gives  















lnln dd
ddd
 . As a result we have: 
 lnlnln ddd  . If   is a parameter, then 0ln d  and  lnln dd  . 
The Mfd ln  transformation into the form QdMdAd ln
)1(
)lnln(



 
  is similarly 
derived.  
 
The sigma derivation (A1.13): 


lnlnlnln
lnln
lnln
lnln
ddMdAd
MdAd
fdfd
MdAd
AM 




  
This is so because 
 AdQddMdQddfdfd AM lnlnlnlnlnln)lnln( 
 lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln ddMdAdAddMdd   
(A.1.17) 
 
If we assume that   and   are variables, then lnd  and lnd  are not equal to zero, thus,   
is not equal to one.  
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Appendix 2 
 The input supply function conversion into the logarithmic form 
 
In order to receive percentage changes of variables, the given agricultural input supply function 
is converted into a logarithmic form by the following procedure: 
),( ZAkP  (A.2.1) 
),(lnln ZAkP  (A.2.2) 
),(lnln ZAkdPd   (A.2.3) 
dZ
ZAk
k
dA
ZAk
k
Pd ZA
),(),(
ln   
(A.2.4) 
.
),(),(
ln dZ
Z
Z
ZAk
k
dA
A
A
ZAk
k
Pd ZA   
(A.2.5) 
        
Knowing that Ad
A
dA ln , and Zd
Z
dZ ln we have:  
ZdZ
ZAk
k
AdA
ZAk
k
Pd ZA ln
),(
ln
),(
ln   
(A.2.6) 
      
Knowing that 
A
P
kA


 , and 
Z
PkM 
  we have:        
,ln
),(
ln
),(
ln Zd
ZAk
Z
Z
P
Ad
ZAk
A
A
P
Pd 





  
(A.2.7) 
    
As ),( ZAkP , we have: 
Zd
P
Z
Z
PAd
P
A
A
PPd lnlnln 



  (A.2.8) 
           
and also: 
ZdAdPd lnlnln    (A.2.9) 
     
Supply of material input is converted into the logarithmic form in a similar way.    
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Appendix 3 
 The output demand function conversion into the logarithmic form 
 
In order to receive percentage changes of variables, the given output demand function is 
converted into a logarithmic form by the following procedure: 
)(QhR   (A.3.1) 
)(lnln QhR   (A.3.2) 
)(lnln QhdRd   (A.3.3) 
dQ
Qh
h
Rd
Q
)(
ln   
(A.3.4) 
dQ
Q
Q
Qh
h
Rd
Q

)(
ln  
(A.3.5) 
        
Knowing that Qd
Q
dQ
ln , we have:  
QdQ
Qh
h
Rd
Q
ln
)(
ln   
(A.3.6) 
      
Knowing that 
Q
R
hQ


 , we have:        
Qd
Qh
Q
Q
R
Rd ln
)(
ln 


  
(A.3.7) 
    
As )(QhR  , we have: 
Qd
R
Q
Q
R
Rd lnln 


  
(A.3.8) 
           
and also: 
,lnln QdRd
Q
R
R
Q



 
(A.3.9) 
         
We know that 
Q
R
R
Q



 is a typical formula for the price elasticity of demand. So, we may write it 
down like this: 
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,lnln RdQd   (A.3.10) 
 
 
where   is the price elasticity of demand. 
As we consider the elasticity  of  in absolute terms,
Q
R
R
Q



 , the negative slope of the 
demand function is reflected by the extra included negative sign:  
.lnln RdQd    (A.3.11) 
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Appendix 4 
 The production function conversion into the logarithmic form 
 
In order to receive percentage changes of variables, the given production function is transformed 
into a logarithmic form by the following procedure: 
 
),( MAfQ   (A.4.1) 
),(lnln MAfQ   (A.4.2) 
).,(lnln MAfdQd   (A.4.3) 
        
Differentiating ),( MAf by A will be equal to dA
MAf
fA
),(
. Similarly, differentiating by M, we 
have: 
dM
MAf
f
dA
MAf
f
Qd
MA
),(),(
ln   
(A.4.4) 
.
),(),(
ln
M
M
dM
MAf
f
A
A
dA
MAf
f
Qd
MA
  
(A.4.5) 
        
Knowing that Ad
A
dA
ln , and Md
M
dM
ln , and  taking alpha and beta equal to 
M
MAf
f
A
MAf
f MA

),(
,
),(
 , we have:   
 
.lnlnln MdAdQd    (A.4.6) 
 
The equation above is a production function transformed into a logarithmic form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
Appendix 5 
 The derivation of the output product price  
 
As the upstream market is characterised by imperfect competition, the output product price R is 
determined by the profit maximisation procedure: 
  ,,,)( iiii QWPCQQR   (A.5.1) 
which implies: 
 
,0
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Q
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(A.5.2) 
where      
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(A.5.3) 
 
Then the profit optimization function will be: 
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(A.5.4) 
 
Now sum this equation over the n firms (Cowling and Waterson, 1976): 
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Taking 


n
i
i QQ
1
, and **
1
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n
i
i  we have:  
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Dividing the whole equation by R(Q) yields: 
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96 
 
 
Taking the second fraction as 
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                                                           (A.5.9) 
or  
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(A.5.10) 
Now, multiplying by andQR )( , yields:  
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Writing RasQR )(  and  as*)1(  , we have: 
,
i
i
Q
C
n
n
R







 
(A.5.13) 
 
where 
i
i
Q
C


 are marginal costs. If we write 



n
n
, then we may conclude that  
,CR    (A.5.14) 
 
where C is marginal costs. Noting that the price elasticity of demand is taken in absolute terms 
( )/( QRhR ), we have:  
.





n
n
 
(A.5.15) 
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Appendix 6 
The elasticity of the industry mark-up 
 
Appendix 5 indicates the retail price equals marginal costs multiplied by the industry mark-up:  
,CR   (A.6.1) 
which, being transformed into a logarithmic form, is:  
.lnlnln CddRd    (A.6.2) 
 
Write CdRd
Rd
d
Rd lnln
ln
ln
ln 



, and take   Rdd ln/ln , where   is the elasticity of 
monopoly mark-up  (  also represents a fall (rise) in price-cost 
margins RdCdRd ln/)lnln(  ).  
This will give: 
CdRdRd lnlnln    (A.6.3) 
 
Simplifying, we have: 
CdRdRd lnlnln    (A.6.4) 
or  
.ln)1(ln RdCd   (A.6.5) 
 
Besides, we may also conclude that )1/(lnln  CdRd , which means that changes in the 
output price depend on the elasticity of the monopoly mark-up.   is also equal to 
)/(   n , where Rdd ln/ln  . This is because   is the elasticity of monopoly 
mark-up  : 



R
R



 . 
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Appendix 7  
The equilibrium condition for the agricultural input market 
 
Equating the agricultural input demand  
AfCP   (A.7.1) 
   
with the agricultural input supply  
),,( ZAkP   (A.7.2) 
 
both transformed into percentage changes, yields: 
QdMdAdCdZdAd ln
)1(
)lnln(lnlnln






  
(A.7.3) 
and also 
.lnln
)1(
)lnln(lnln AdQdMdAdCdZd 




 

  
(A.7.4) 
 
Noting that MdAdQd lnlnln   , and opening the brackets, we have: 
 
AdMdAdMdAdCdZd lnln
)1(
ln
)1(
lnlnlnln 








 



  
(A.7.5) 
Grouping As together and Ms together gives: 
MdAdCdZd ln)
)1(
(ln)
)1(
(lnln













  
(A.7.6) 
.ln)
)1(
(ln)
)1(
(lnln MdAdCdZd








  
(A.7.7) 
 
Using RdCd ln)1(ln   (see Appendix 6 for proof) yields: 
RdMdAdZd ln
)1(
ln)
)1(
(ln)
)1(
(ln












  
(A.7.8) 
or  
.ln
)1(
ln)
)1(
(ln)
)1(
(ln RdMdAdZd












  
(A.7.9) 
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Appendix 8 
The equilibrium condition for the material input market 
 
Equating the material input demand MfCW    with the material input supply )(MgW  , both 
transformed into percentage changes, yields: 
.ln
)1(
)lnln(lnln QdMdAdCdMd






  
(A.8.1) 
 
Noting that RdCd ln)1(ln  , and MdAdQd lnlnln   , gives: 
).lnln(
)1(
)lnln(ln)1(ln MdAdMdAdRdMd 




 

  
(A.8.2) 
 
Below is the simplification procedure:  
 
MdAdMdAdRdMd ln
)1(
ln
)1(
lnlnln)1(ln 













  
(A.8.3) 
MdMdMdAdAdRd lnln
)1(
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)1(
lnln)1(0 
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

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
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
 



  
(A.8.4) 
MdMdMdAdAdRd lnln
)1(
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)1(
lnln)1(0 
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
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

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
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
 



  
(A.8.5) 
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)1(
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)1(
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)1(
0 MdAdRd 




 
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



 





 

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
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

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(A.8.6) 
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Appendix 9  
The derivation of price transmission elasticity 
  
Given are percentage changes in the retail and agricultural input prices respectively, followed by 
the exogenous shock Z: 
  
   )1()1()1()1(
ln1
ln




 Zd
Rd  
(A.9.1) 
     
   
.
)1()1()1()1(
11)1(
ln





Pd  
(A.9.2) 
 
The general expression for the farm to retail price transmission followed by the exogenous shock 
on the farm level is given by: 
ZdPd
ZdRd
ln/ln
ln/ln
 . Simplifying yields: 
  
         Zd
D
D
Zd
ln111
ln1






  
(A.9.3) 
or 
 
      
,
11
1





  
(A.9.4) 
where 
   .)1()1()1()1(  D  
(A.9.5) 
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Appendix 10 
Description of the equilibrium displacement model  
“Price transmission of joint products” 
 
The analysis presented below adapts McCorriston, Morgan and Reyner‟s (2001) analysis of an 
imperfectly competitive food sector with production function characterised by non-constant 
returns to scale to the situation where this food industry supplies two jointly-produced products. 
The dairy industry is taken as an example with its production of butter and skim milk powder 
(SMP) as jointly-produced goods-complements in production. All three goods are assumed to be 
homogenous in production. We take McCorriston‟s assumption about the material inputs and 
agricultural input to be supplied by competitive industries, and that the food (dairy) sector is 
unable to exert market power in the purchase of material and milk inputs.  
  
The dairy industry joint production function is 
 
),,()2,1( MAfQQg   (A.10.1) 
 
where AQQ ,2,1  and M are, respectively, first output product (butter), second output product 
(SMP), agricultural input (milk) and material input. The dairy industry production function is 
assumed to be homogenous of degree  .   
  
The inverse demand functions for the two jointly-produced outputs are  
 
)1(11 QkP   (A.10.2) 
),2(22 QkP   (A.10.3) 
 
where 1P  is the price of butter and 2P  is the price of SMP or cheese. 1Q  and 2Q  are the output 
quantities of the two outputs, respectively.  
 
The inverse input supply functions are 
 
),( ZAhX   (A.10.4) 
),(* MhY   (A.10.5) 
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where A and M are agricultural and material input quantities, and X and Y are their prices 
respectively. The variable Z represents the exogenously occurred shock in the agricultural sector. 
 
Cost minimisation in the food sector gives 
 
AfCX   (A.10.6) 
,MfCY   (A.10.7) 
 
where C is marginal costs and MfAf ,  are marginal products of agricultural and material inputs, 
respectively: MMAfMfAMAfAf  /),(,/),( .  
 
Using the profit maximization condition for one firm in the industry and then summing the 
received condition over all the firms in the industry (n) gives the equilibrium condition in the 
dairy sector 
 
2
2
222
111
1
111
1
1 Pn
knk
knk
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knk
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P

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
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
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

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


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

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


 



 




  
(A.10.8a) 
 
,21 PCP    
  
(A.10.8b) 
 
where  )2(1 kk  represents the share of one firm‟s first (second) output in the throughput of this 
firm, )2(1   is demand elasticity for the first (second) jointly-produced outputs,   is the market 
power parameter and 















111
1
knk
n
reflects the mark-up of price over costs. In the case of a 
single output under the perfect competition condition 1 . In the case of a joint output even in 
perfect competition   should be greater than one. This is because an oligopolist maximises his 
profit operating on two markets instead of one. Thus, under the perfect competition the price of a 
first product could not be equal to marginal costs, but will be equal to marginal costs minus price 
of the second product. The pass-through coefficient   represents the share of the second price in 
marginal costs and is equal to  









 
2
222


n
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Totally differentiating the system of equations (A1)-(A8b) and converting to percentage changes 
in logarithmic form gives 
 
 
2lnlnln1ln QdMdAdQd    
 
(A.10.9) 
1ln11ln PdQd   
 
(A.10.10) 
2ln22ln PdQd   
 
(A.10.11) 
ZdAdXd lnlnln    
 
(A.10.12) 
MdYd lnln   
 
(A.10.13) 
1ln
)1(
)2ln1ln()lnln(lnln QdQdQgdMdAdCdXd 





 
  
 
 
(A.10.14) 
1ln
)1(
)2ln1ln()lnln(lnln QdQdQgdMdAdCdYd 





 
  
 
 
(A.10.15) 
2lnlnlnlnln1ln PbddbdbCdadaPd    
 
(A.10.16a) 
2ln2ln1ln1ln1lnln PdbPdbPdbPdaPdCd    
 
(A.10.16b) 
.2ln
)1(
1ln
)(1
ln Pd
a
b
Pd
a
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Cd 










 




 
 
 
(A.10.16c) 
In the equations above, 1/ PCa  , 1/2 PPb  , and their difference is equal unity,   is the 
elasticity of the industry mark-up and is equal to )1/(1   n  with 1  representing the 
change in the elasticity of demand of the first product for a given change in the retail price of this 
product: 1ln/1ln1 Pdd   .   is the elasticity of the pass-through coefficient and is equal to 
)
2
/(2   n  with 2  representing the change in the elasticity of demand of the second 
product for a given change in the retail price of this product: 2ln/2ln2 Pdd   . The   coefficient 
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shows the degree of influence of one of the joint product‟s price on another.   and   are output 
elasticities (   ), ,  and   are inverse input supply elasticities and   is the elasticity of 
substitution between agricultural and material inputs, all evaluated at equilibrium. The cost 
shares are equal to  
1
/
1
QgAf
Q
A  and  1/ 1QgMf QM . Parameter  1/2 12 QgQg QQ  or  
equivalently 2ln/1ln QdQd , which in the case of fixed relationship between two outputs 
equals unity.   
 
Knowing that the relationship between the first and second outputs is fixed with   
 
,2ln1ln QdQd   (A.10.17) 
 
we will solve the percentage changes in the nine endogenous variables 
( YXMAPPQQ ,,,,2,1,2,1  and C ) in terms of the percentage changes in the endogenous 
variable Z. Substituting equations (A12), (A13), and (A16) into (A14) and (A15) and also (A10) 
into (A9), taking (A17) into consideration we receive a system of five equations: 
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(A.10.18) 
2lnln
)1(
ln
)1(1(
2ln
)1(
1ln
)(1
0
QdMd
AdPd
a
b
Pd
a
ab














































 
 
 
(A.10.19) 
1ln12lnlnln0 PdQdMdAd    
 
(A.10.20) 
2ln22ln PdQd   
 
(A.10.21) 
.2ln1ln QdQd   
 
(A.10.22) 
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Solving the system of equations above (from (A18) to (A22)) gives solutions for each of the 
endogenous variables. Focusing on the price transmission from the agricultural input (milk) price 
to the first output (butter) price, we receive 
 
 
.
)1(2
1ln
1ln
D
aSa
E
Xd
Pd 


 
 
(A.10.23) 
 
Focusing on the price transmission from the agricultural input (milk) price to the second output 
(skim milk powder) price, we receive 
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)1(1
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D
aSa
E
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Pd 

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(A.10.24) 
The difference between 1E  and 2E is as follows 
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(A.10.25) 
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As a result we have 
1
2
2
1


E
E . (A.10.26) 
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